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  INTRODUCTION   
In a globalized world, the consequences of environmental 
degradation rarely stop at the border. When a sewage intercep-
tor collapsed in the City of Tijuana, Mexico, in February 2017, 
over 140 million gallons of raw sewage spilled into the ocean.1 
The incident fouled twenty miles of the Pacific coastline, raising 
concerns in California about impacts on local health, environ-
ment, and the economy.2 A group of U.S. municipalities and the 
State of California resolved to sue the U.S. federal government 
for its failure to work out a plan with its southern neighbor to 
prevent pollution.3 The United States’ northern neighbor also of-
ten sits at the end of the tailpipe. Over fifty percent of air pollu-
tion in the Province of Ontario—more than ninety percent in 
some municipalities—originates in the United States.4 Alarm 
bells thus went off north of the border when the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency announced a plan in 2006 to ease 
 
 1. Alex Dobuzinskis, Cause of Mexican Sewage Spill Fouling U.S. Beaches 
Under Investigation, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2017), https://in.reuters.com/article/us 
-usa-mexico-sewage/cause-of-mexican-sewage-spill-fouling-u-s-beaches-under 
-investigation-idINKBN16B02R. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Joshua Emerson Smith, California Sues Federal Government over Ti-
juana Sewage Spilling into San Diego, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 4, 2018), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/sd-me-sewage-lawsuit-20180905 
-story.html; Joshua Emerson Smith, San Diego Joins South Bay Cities in Legal 
Fight Against Feds on Tijuana Sewage Spills, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 4, 
2017), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/environment/sd-me-san 
-diego-sewage-ibwc-20171004-story.html. 
 4. News Release, Ont. Ministry Env’t & Climate Change, Ontario Chal-
lenges U.S. to Protect Air Quality (Feb. 17, 2006), https://news.ontario.ca/ 
archive/en/2006/02/17/Ontario-Challenges-US-To-Protect-Air-Quality.html. 
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emission controls for coal-burning power plants.5 In a rare move, 
Ontario and the City of Toronto filed comments in the U.S. reg-
ulatory process.6  
As these examples suggest, we often look to governments to 
protect their residents from neighborhood pollution, and they 
have a variety of tools—political, economic, and legal—at their 
disposal to do so. If diplomacy fails, States also have a longstand-
ing right under international law to seek protection, and repara-
tions, for transboundary environmental harm from other 
States—a right first articulated in a U.S. proceeding against 
Canada over air pollution in the 1930s.7 But whether govern-
ments choose to exert pressure on their neighbors in a given 
case, whether that pressure is successful, and whether they ul-
timately decide to exercise their legal rights through inter-State 
dispute proceedings depends on a number of factors. Picking a 
fight with a foreign government is costly, and localized injuries 
to human health and the environment will often be dwarfed by 
the perceived need for bilateral cooperation on other issues, such 
as trade, defense, or border control. Tellingly, in the above ex-
amples, national governments, which are responsible for foreign 
relations, have lagged behind their subnational counterparts in 
taking action on behalf of their citizens.  
But, in many cases, local governments will not act either. 
This shifts the onus on individual citizens to seek redress for the 
injury they suffered, which can be problematic, as individuals do 
not have a cognizable claim against the foreign State under gen-
eral international law.8 But does this mean that individual vic-
tims would have no remedy?  
Not necessarily. Affected individuals and communities in 
theory have two main avenues to seek redress for transboundary 
environmental harm. First, they could try holding their home 
State liable in the domestic legal system for failing to protect 
them from external sources of harm. This was the course of ac-
 
 5. Id. In 2005, air pollution cost Ontario nearly $10 billion in damages, 
including $6.6 billion in health costs. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), Award, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941). See infra 
Part IV.A. 
 8. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protec-
tion with Commentaries, in Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, art. 1, 
at 24, cmt. ¶ 4, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection].  
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tion chosen by several U.S. municipalities, California, and an en-
vironmental organization following the Tijuana sewage spill.9 By 
forcing the home State (here, the U.S. federal government) to 
take responsibility for the domestic consequences of cross-border 
pollution, the ultimate aim of domestic litigation of this kind is 
to encourage more proactive management and coordination of 
transboundary issues at the international level.10  
Second, affected individuals and communities could seek 
remedies under the domestic law of the foreign State in which 
the harm originates. Transboundary litigation by victims of pol-
lution in national courts of the foreign State is an attractive 
workaround for the difficulties posed by inter-State litigation.11 
In many cases, the harm can be traced back to the activities of 
private actors, and the domestic judicial system of the foreign 
State may offer redress. For this option to be viable, however, 
domestic and foreign victims would need to have equal access to 
seek relief on a nondiscriminatory basis. Since the 1970s, the so-
called right of equal access has found growing support in inter-
national instruments.12 However, practical challenges abound. 
 
 9. See supra note 3; see also Press Release, Cal. Dep’t Justice, Attorney 
General Becerra and San Diego Water Board: We’re Ready to File Suit over 
Public Health Threats Posed by Tijuana River Sewage (May 14, 2018), https:// 
oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-and-san-diego-water 
-board-we’re-ready-file-suit-over. 
 10. This Article does not analyze this option since the primary vehicle for 
redress is domestic litigation and any action by the home State on the interna-
tional plane remains discretionary. 
There are also other possible legal permutations, such as attempts to hold 
the foreign entity responsible for transboundary pollution to account in the 
courts of the State in which the harm is felt. However, this could raise concerns 
about the permissible scope of extraterritorial application of domestic law. In 
some circumstances, domestic courts can reach foreign defendants via the ef-
fects doctrine (where, even though the pollution originates abroad, the harm is 
experienced domestically). See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 
F.3d 1066, 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the suit did not involve an 
extraterritorial application of a U.S. federal statute because pollution from a 
Canadian smelter had “come to be located” in the United States); cf. Pakootas 
v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 573 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 11. See generally Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: Where 
Next?, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 613, 635 (2012). 
 12. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD], Recommendation of the Council for the Implementation of a Regime of 
Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pol-
lution, OECD/LEGAL/0152 (May 17, 1977), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/ 
public/doc/17/17.en.pdf (setting forth principles concerning transfrontier pollu-
tion); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Rec-
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Equal access is still illusory in many legal systems given the dif-
ficulties and expense of litigating claims in foreign courts. Even 
where equal access is recognized, causes of action and remedies 
available under the domestic law of the foreign State may be lim-
ited.13 Most crucially, if access to justice in the national courts of 
the State in which the harm originated is denied, would trans-
national claimants have any direct recourse or remedy against 
the State under international law? 
This Article explores that question. In particular, it exam-
ines whether the State in which the harm originates has respon-
sibilities under international human rights law (IHRL) toward 
residents of other States who are harmed by transboundary pol-
lution—an issue that requires us to consider the regime nexus, 
or intersection, between two congruent international regimes: 
the human rights regime and the environmental regime. The re-
gime nexus, as developed in this Article, denotes the area of fac-
tual or legal overlap between two legal regimes. We can encoun-
ter a de jure regime nexus where two bodies of law seek to 
regulate the same subject matter. We can also encounter regime 
nexus de facto—where one regime facilitates or impedes the ob-
jectives of another regime. This corresponds, respectively, to sit-
uations of regime congruence and regime conflict, as discussed 
further below.14 
The fact that two regimes intersect, or even share a high 
degree of interdependence, does not mean that the underlying 
 
ommendation of the Council on Equal Right of Access in Relation to Transfron-
tier Pollution, OECD/LEGAL/0140 (Nov. 5, 1976), https://legalinstruments.oecd 
.org/public/doc/13/13.en.pdf (recommending equal right of access to member 
States’ legal systems); see also infra Part V.B.3.  
 13. For example, foreign law may not provide for mass-tort claims, or it 
might limit recovery. This partly accounts for the rise of another type of trans-
national environmental litigation, where victims of domestic pollution seek rem-
edies in the courts of the foreign State in which the private entity allegedly re-
sponsible for pollution is incorporated. See, e.g., Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. Plc 
[2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, [34]–[38] (appeal taken from EWHC (TCC)) (Eng.) 
(upholding jurisdiction over proceedings by Zambian claimants against U.K.-
incorporated parent and its Zambian subsidiary in the U.K. courts arising out 
of alleged pollution and environmental damage caused by a copper mine in Zam-
bia); Dooh v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc, 200.126.843-01, Judgment, ¶¶ 3.1–3.9, 
(Gerechtshof Den Haag [Hague Court of Appeal]) (Neth.) (Dec. 18, 2015), http:// 
uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3586 
(permitting Nigerian claimants to sue a Dutch-headquartered defendant in 
Dutch courts for environmental damage caused by oil pipelines in Nigeria). 
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
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rights and obligations are automatically transferable or coexten-
sive, but it could affect the scope of State obligations under those 
regimes. In particular, this Article seeks to identify the potential 
extent of State responsibility for human rights violations in the 
light of international environmental law. Specifically, it consid-
ers whether, and to what extent, the obligations that interna-
tional environmental law imposes on States vis-à-vis each other 
should shape the content of duties that States owe under human 
rights treaties to individual rights-holders beyond their jurisdic-
tion. 
There have been no contentious proceedings on this issue,15 
which also remains curiously under-analyzed in the literature. 
Human rights tribunals have recognized in the domestic setting 
that a healthy environment is a prerequisite for the protection 
of human rights, but have yet to do so in a transboundary con-
text. Meanwhile, disputes involving transboundary environmen-
tal harm (even when it entails human rights violations) have 
been left to inter-State proceedings, which, as alluded to above, 
are “most remarkable by their paucity.”16 States have full discre-
tion to espouse (or not) claims on behalf of their citizens, as in 
the now-abandoned proceedings by Ecuador against Colombia in 
the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case.17 This means that, in some 
cases, international human rights law might offer the best, if not 
the only, protection to injured persons whose home State cannot, 
or chooses not to, espouse their claims. In the Americas, this 
proposition was tested in a recent advisory proceeding before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court 
or IACtHR)18—and found considerable support in the Court, as 
discussed further below.19  
 
 15. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUR., MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 25 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter COE MANUAL] (“The Court has not de-
cided on cases relating to environmental protection which raise extra-territorial 
and transboundary issues.”). 
 16. A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of Na-
tional and International Law, 17 J. ENVTL. L. 3, 26 (2005). 
 17. See Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.), INT’L CT. JUST., 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/138 (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).  
 18. See Request for Advisory Opinion by Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/solicitudoc/solicitud_14_03_16_ing 
.pdf.  
 19. Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the 
Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to 
Life and to Personal Integrity – Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 
5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-
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The urgency of crafting individual remedies for transbound-
ary harm—and clarifying the scope of resulting State obliga-
tions—will only grow with the pace of technological and eco-
nomic change and humanity’s capacity to reshape their 
environment in the Anthropocene,20 with irreversible impacts. 
Polluting media like air and water do not respect political bound-
aries. Aerial herbicide spraying, offshore drilling, damming of 
rivers, forest burning, freshwater exploitation, industrial activ-
ity, and geoengineering experiments can all teleport risks and 
impacts across national borders and impair the rights of people 
far beyond the area where the damaging activity originates.21 
By clarifying the nature of State obligations under human 
rights treaties when activities within a State’s territory or con-
trol result in transboundary harm, this Article also makes sev-
eral contributions to the literature. First, it helps delineate the 
scope of extraterritorial obligations in international law.22 The 
question of extraterritoriality under human rights law in the 
 
23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Environ-
ment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion], http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/ 
opiniones/seriea_23_esp.pdf (in Spanish). For a discussion, see Maria L. Banda, 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Environment 
and Human Rights, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: INSIGHTS (May 10, 2018), https://www 
.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/6/inter-american-court-human-rights 
-advisory-opinion-environment-and-human. The Author acted as counsel in the 
proceedings; the views expressed here are entirely my own. 
 20. This term is used to describe the new era characterized by humanity’s 
unprecedented power to reshape the natural world. See generally Richard Mon-
astersky, Anthropocene: The Human Age, 519 NATURE 144 (2015). 
 21. Cf. Maria L. Banda, Climate Adaptation Law: Optimizing Legal Design 
for Multi-Level Public Goods, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1027 (2018) (arguing 
that climate adaptation requires a multi-level legal framework to address its 
local, transboundary, and global dimensions). 
 22. On extraterritorial obligations, see generally EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLI-
CATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga 
eds., 2004); MICHAL GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBALISING 
WORLD: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2009); 
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS (Mark Gib-
ney & Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010); MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLI-
CATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); 
MAARTEN DEN HEIJER, EUROPE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL ASYLUM (2012); KAREN 
DA COSTA, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES (2013); GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter GLOBAL JUSTICE].  
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context of transboundary environmental harm is still largely un-
examined,23 and the circumstances that may give rise to extra-
territorial obligations remain a subject of controversy.24 Envi-
ronmental dimensions are also rarely discussed in general 
academic treatments of human rights,25 and there is an urgent 
need for further analysis and clarification by international insti-
tutions.26 Second, this Article pushes the boundaries of how we 
think about the enforcement of international environmental law 
by showing that the human rights regime offers a viable proce-
dural avenue for victims of environmental harm. Third, by de-
veloping the concept of a regime nexus and analyzing the scope 
of State obligations between two congruent legal regimes, this 
Article also contributes to the literature on the fragmentation of 
international law.27 The whole complex of inter-regime relations 
is presently a “legal black hole.”28 In particular, this Article 
shows that clarifying the points of regime intersection, or nexus, 
allows for a more coherent and unified conception of State re-
 
 23. See Boyle, supra note 11, at 637 (asking whether the (domestic) obliga-
tion to protect human rights from environmental nuisances also applies extra-
territorially and noting a “failure of much of the literature to deal with this 
question in any depth (or even to ask it)”). But see John H. Knox, Diagonal En-
vironmental Rights, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OB-
LIGATIONS, supra note 22, at 82 (analyzing environmental rights held by indi-
viduals against States other than their own). 
 24. DEN HEIJER, supra note 22, at 18. 
 25. Boyle, supra note 11, at 614. 
 26. In 2011, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) determined there is an open “question” of “the extent to which inter-
national environmental law principles can inform the application of human 
rights instruments.” U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Analytical Study on 
the Relationship Between Human Rights and the Environment, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/19/34 (Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter OHCHR Report]. The report noted 
that “[t]he extraterritorial dimensions of the human rights and environment 
interface provide fertile ground for further inquiry, particularly in relation to 
transboundary and global environmental issues,” as “[t]he linkage between hu-
man rights and the environment raises the question whether human rights law 
recognizes States’ extraterritorial obligations.” Id. ¶ 64. It invited the Human 
Rights Council to provide “further guidance . . . to inform options for further 
development of the law,” especially “relating to the extraterritorial obligations 
of States” in the area of environmental protection. Id. ¶¶ 73, 80. 
 27. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group on the Frag-
mentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 
13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC Fragmentation Report] (finalized by Martti Kosken-
niemi).  
 28. Id. at 253. 
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sponsibility and advances systemic interpretation in interna-
tional law.  
As employed in this Article, the term transboundary envi-
ronmental harm refers to the harm caused in the territory—or 
in other places under the jurisdiction or control—of a State other 
than the State of origin, whether or not the States concerned 
share a common border.29 This definition also includes damage 
to the global commons or damage resulting from activities on the 
high seas under the jurisdiction or control of a State.30  
Transboundary environmental harm varies widely in scale 
and complexity. First, transboundary harm can be localized and 
affect two neighboring States in a limited border-area. The Ti-
juana sewage spill discussed above is an example of a localized 
transboundary problem where industrial activities in one State 
have adverse environmental, economic, or health impacts on its 
neighbor. Second, transboundary harm can be regional and af-
fect a wider area involving two or more States. Dam construction 
along an international watershed like the Columbia River or the 
Mekong, diversion of waters from a shared body of water such as 
the Great Lakes or the Aral Sea, or radioactive fallout from the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster are all regional harms. Finally, today 
a failure to control domestic activities can also generate global 
environmental harm due to intensifying economic activity, pop-
ulation pressures, and technological change. The depletion of the 
ozone layer, emission of greenhouse gases, and ocean pollution 
are all examples of global harms, affecting areas far beyond the 
national jurisdiction. As discussed below, the human rights re-
gime—and general international law—are least able to deal with 
the third type of harm. 
As the second point of clarification, this Article is not con-
cerned with extraterritorial application of domestic law. The 
term transboundary obligation, as used here, refers to duties im-
posed on the State under customary or conventional interna-
tional law for acts or omissions originating within its own terri-
tory, whether they are caused by State agents or private parties. 
It does not refer to any additional obligations a State might incur 
as a result of the conduct of its transnational companies or busi-
 
 29. Cf. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities, in Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, 
art. 2(c), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Prevention]. 
 30. Cf. id. 
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ness entities incorporated under its laws or present in its terri-
tory, when the latter are acting in the territory of another 
State.31 The State’s duty to regulate the conduct of enterprises 
abroad (when they operate in the legal space of another sover-
eign) is distinct from its duty to regulate domestic conduct that 
may have extraterritorial effects and is beyond the scope of this 
analysis.  
Finally, this Article looks most closely at the practice of the 
Inter-American human rights system, which takes on an out-
sized importance for the United States. The United States is not 
a party to a number of multilateral environmental treaty re-
gimes (including soon the Paris Agreement), which, in any event, 
generally do not contemplate a mechanism for establishing lia-
bility. The United States has also not signed the First Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), which would permit individual Americans to 
submit claims to the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) 
in Geneva,32 and it is not a party to the American Convention on 
Human Rights (American Convention).33 The United States is, 
however, an original signatory to the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration),34 and the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) treats 
the rights set out in the American Declaration as legally binding 
on those States that have not ratified the American Conven-
tion.35  
 
 31. See OHCHR Report, supra note 26, ¶ 67; see also Hearing on the Impact 
of Canadian Mining Activities on Human Rights in Latin America During the 
153rd Session, INTER-AM. COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS. (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/audiencias/TopicsList.aspx?Lang=en&Topic=17 (fol-
low “Impact of Canadian Mining Activities on Human Rights in Latin America” 
hyperlink) (discussing Canada’s polices affecting human rights abroad). 
 32. For status, see UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties 
.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chater=4&clang=_ 
en (last visited Mar. 27, 2019); see also infra note 74. 
 33. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human 
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) 
[hereinafter American Convention]. The United States has also not accepted 
protocols permitting individual claims under other human rights treaties. See 
infra note 74. 
 34. Ninth International Conference of American States, American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 
21, rev. 6 (May 2, 1948) [hereinafter American Declaration], reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, at 17 (1992). 
 35. This may be surprising since the American Declaration is not a treaty 
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This has two significant implications. First, applying the ar-
gument developed in this Article, the United States could poten-
tially incur international responsibility under the American Dec-
laration for a range of acts or omissions within its jurisdiction 
that have transboundary consequences. This might follow, for 
example, a failure to control cross-border pollution from offshore 
drilling platforms approved by U.S. agencies, damage from U.S. 
unregulated agricultural runoff in the Gulf of Mexico, or climate-
caused harms that can be traced back to the United States. Sec-
ond, American residents harmed by foreign pollution would 
equally be entitled to direct recourse against any neighboring 
countries that are parties to the American Declaration or the 
Convention and whose failure to control domestic pollution has 
violated their rights. The argument developed in this Article 
thus cuts both ways and could increase accountability through-
 
and arguably not a source of binding legal obligations. Instead, the Commis-
sion’s powers in relation to this group of States (which in addition to the United 
States includes Canada, Venezuela, and eight Caribbean countries) are set out 
in Article 20 of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, art. 20, Oct. 1979, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/ 
basics/statute-inter-american-court-human-rights.pdf.  
The Commission first applied the Declaration to the U.S. in 1981 by virtue 
of the U.S. ratification in 1952 of the Charter of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, which recognizes 
the Commission’s competence over human rights. See White v. United States, 
Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Resolution No. 23/81, OEA.Ser.L/V/II.54, 
doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶¶ 15–17 (1981). The Commission has maintained this interpreta-
tion in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Roach v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Resolution No. 3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶¶ 46–49 
(1987); see also Thomas Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protec-
tion of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 833–35 (1975). The United States 
has long disputed this view. See Response of the Government of the United States 
of America to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report 85/00 of 
October 23, 2000 Concerning Mariel Cubans (Case No. 9903), U.S. DEP’T ST.,  
¶ 2 (Nov. 2001), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16532.pdf; In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2015 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 7, §E(1) at 294. 
In contrast, the Inter-American Court is competent to hear claims only 
against States Parties to the American Convention—but in that case it can also 
examine claims arising under the Declaration. See Interpretation of the Ameri-
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Ar-
ticle 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 35–36, 42–47 (July 14, 1989). 
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out the Hemisphere. It could also increase access to environmen-
tal justice in other countries and regions that grant their citizens 
access to human rights courts.36 
The analysis proceeds in five steps. Part I describes the par-
allel and separate evolution of the international human rights 
and environmental regimes, their logic, and their structural de-
sign. Focusing on international human rights courts, Part II ex-
amines the increasing recognition of the regime nexus. The 
nexus in the domestic context is clear and well-established; the 
question is whether human rights treaties give courts a basis to 
address transboundary (i.e., extraterritorial) issues. Part III 
thus examines existing jurisprudence on the extraterritorial 
scope of State obligations under human rights treaties to distill 
a doctrinal basis for their application to transboundary environ-
mental harm. Part IV analyzes the content of the general duty 
to prevent transboundary harm under customary and interna-
tional environmental law. Building on the foregoing, Part V ar-
gues that the nature of the obligation under human rights trea-
ties in cases involving transboundary environmental harm must 
be read in the light of international environmental law. It also 
considers several implementation challenges arising from the 
argument presented in this Article.  
 
 36. There is a substantial flow of norms and interpretive principles between 
human rights tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
and U.N. treaty-bodies (such as the U.N. Human Rights Committee). See Cae-
sar v. Trinidad & Tobago, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, ¶¶ 6–12 (Mar. 11, 2005) (Cançado Trindade, J., sepa-
rate opinion) (discussing “converging case-law”); Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel of 
Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 791, 798 
(2006) (noting that human rights courts “work consciously to coordinate their 
approaches”); cf. Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, What Do We Mean When We Talk 
About Judicial Dialogue: Reflections of a Judge of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 30 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89 (2017). 
Where relevant, the jurisprudence of those institutions is also considered 
in this Article. This jurisprudence necessarily focuses on civil and political 
rights, though economic, social, and cultural rights are obviously implicated by 
environmental degradation. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, 
Gen. Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 
¶ 34, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (“States should also refrain from 
unlawfully polluting air, water and soil, e.g. through industrial waste from 
State-owned facilities, from using or testing nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons if such testing results in the release of substances harmful to human 
health . . . .”). 
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I. PARALLEL REGIME EMERGENCE: THE LOGIC AND 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
International environmental law and international human 
rights law have each made great strides since 1945, developing 
into thick normative regimes with binding legal rules, rulemak-
ing processes, and enforcement procedures. For much of their 
history, this evolution proceeded along two separate tracks. De-
spite the recognition of their potential congruence beginning in 
the early 1970s,37 these two bodies of law largely remained dis-
tinct and isolated from one another: international environmen-
tal law spoke to transboundary obligations sovereign States 
owed each other; international human rights law spoke to obli-
gations sovereign States owed their own subjects. The former 
was grounded in reciprocity; the latter in unidirectional notions 
of sovereign responsibility or social contract. The former 
emerged through a mixture of customary norms and multilateral 
treaty making; the latter largely developed as a creature of 
treaty law. This Part reviews the phenomenon of fragmentation 
of international law (Part I.A), the parallel emergence of these 
two congruent regimes (Parts I.B–I.C), and their different logics 
and structure (Part I.D) before turning to their points of inter-
section in Part III.  
A. REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The phenomenon of fragmentation of international law into 
“specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-com-
plexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice” that have 
no clear relationship to each other—such as trade law, environ-
mental law, space law, or investment law—is well-established.38 
A 1971 Report identified seventeen such “topics” or “branches” 
of international law.39 Since then, the web of international law 
and inter-branch relationships has only thickened. I refer to 
 
 37. See infra Part II.A. 
 38. ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 27, ¶ 8; cf. C. Wilfred Jenks, The 
Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 1953 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401, 403–05 (attrib-
uting conflict to development of treaties “in a number of historical, functional 
and regional groups which are separate from each other,” as an “inevitable in-
cident of growth” of international law). 
 39. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Review of the Commission’s Long-Term Pro-
gramme of Work: Survey of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/245 (Working 
Paper, Apr. 23, 1971) [hereinafter ILC 1971 Survey]. 
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these specialized legal systems, which comprise their own sets of 
rules, principles, institutions, treaties, procedures, decision-
making bodies, and standards, simply as regimes.40  
International law may be fragmented, but different regimes 
do not exist in hermetic isolation. They operate against a back-
ground of general international law, custom, and secondary prin-
ciples (such as those on State responsibility).41 They also fre-
quently interact or overlap.42 When they do so, their interaction 
can be characterized by conflict or congruence.  
Much of international law literature in this area is con-
cerned with conflict. The risk of conflict (or incoherence) among 
different emerging legal regimes was a key reason why the In-
ternational Law Commission (ILC) embarked on a study of frag-
mentation.43 Conflict is endemic at the intersection between in-
ternational trade and environmental law, for example.44 
Compliance with environmental norms can act as a restraint on 
trade, while compliance with trade rules can make it difficult for 
a government to promulgate environmental legislation.45 Simi-
larly, the regimes on the use of force and the environment can 
 
 40. See generally Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Con-
sequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185 (1982) (defining 
international regimes as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making proce-
dures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”). 
 41. ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 466 (1961) (“Treaties must 
be applied and interpreted against the background of the general principles of 
international law.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan), Award on 
Jurisdiction & Admissibility, 23 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶ 52 (UNCLOS Arb. Trib. 2000) (“[I]t 
is a commonplace of international law and State practice for more than one 
treaty to bear upon a particular dispute.”); see also G.G. Fitzmaurice (Special 
Rapporteur of the Int’l Law Comm’n), Third Rep. on Law of Treaties, ¶ 89(b), 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (Mar. 18, 1958) [hereinafter Fitzmaurice Report] (describ-
ing treaty “chains” addressing the same problem). 
 43. ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 27, ¶ 15 (noting that “the emer-
gence of new and special types of law, ‘self-contained regimes’ and geograph-
ically or functionally limited treaty-systems” creates “problems of coherence in 
international law”). 
 44. Conflict is understood here “as a situation where two rules or principles 
suggest different ways of dealing with a problem.” Id. ¶ 25. 
 45. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 123–125, WTO Docs. WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998) (Beef Hormones Case) (noting that 
whatever the status of the precautionary principle may be under “international 
environmental law,” and even if it may have “crystallized into a general princi-
ple of customary international environmental law,” it is not binding for the 
WTO). 
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also collide, as compliance with environmental norms can limit 
the right to self-defense, for example, by constraining the use of 
nuclear weapons.46  
In such cases, the key question is how to reconcile, balance, 
or give priority to competing or seemingly incompatible legal 
principles.47 The horizontal nature of international law, in which 
rules and principles belonging to different regimes are not hier-
archically arranged, makes this determination difficult. As the 
ILC Study Group concluded, “normative conflict is endemic to 
international law,” as different regimes are “institutionally pro-
grammed” to prioritize particular concerns over others.48 The an-
swer will often depend on the point of view or the home regime 
of the interpreter making the determination.49 
This Article, however, is more interested in the interaction 
of congruent regimes. As defined in this Article, regimes are con-
gruent (read: mutually supportive or interdependent) when com-
pliance with one regime generally supports the other in practice. 
Here, the question is not so much how to superimpose a hierar-
chy on regimes of equal legal status, or how to derive a principle 
of reconciliation; rather, it is how far we can import principles 
from one congruent regime to interpret and clarify the scope of 
State obligations in another. This contrast between conflicting 
and congruent regimes can be seen in Figure 1 below: 
 
 46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶¶ 30–33 (July 8). For a study of the interaction between 
the IEL regime and international humanitarian law (and how the two could be 
reconciled), see Dinah Shelton & Isabelle Cutting, If You Break It, Do You Own 
It? Legal Consequences of Environmental Harm from Military Activities, 6 J. 
INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 201 (2015) (examining whether IEL obliga-
tions apply to military activities and whether States have a duty to prevent or 
mitigate environmental harm caused by their military activities and compen-
sate for any such damage). 
 47. See, e.g., Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 
I.C.J. Rep. 7, 90 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion by Vice-President Weeramantry) 
(discussing a “principle of reconciliation” that can avert “normative anarchy” 
and prevent “collision” among inconsistent legal rules). 
 48. ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 486, 488. 
 49. Cf. id. ¶ 52. 
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Figure 1. Regime Conflict and Regime Congruence 
 
The relationship between environmental and human rights 
regimes is largely one of congruence: compliance with one regime 
de facto strengthens the rights protected by the other.50 This is 
not to say that human rights and environmental protection 
never come in conflict. Controversies over private property 
rights, as well as whaling, seal trade, or climate mitigation pro-
jects—which often implicate indigenous or traditional cultural 
rights—demonstrate that the two regimes can be in tension. In 
general, however, the relationship between the two regimes is 
one of mutual support.  
In some cases, treaty drafters anticipate factual overlap and 
include specific instructions on how principles from different re-
gimes are to be integrated. For example, the 1988 Narcotics Con-
vention provides that measures to eradicate plants containing 
narcotic substances “shall respect fundamental human rights 
and shall take due account of traditional licit uses, where there 
is historic evidence of such use, as well as the protection of the 
environment.”51 Similarly, the 1992 International Sugar Agree-
ment commits its members to “give due consideration to environ-
mental aspects in all stages of sugar production” and “ensure 
that fair labour standards are maintained.”52 In both of these 
 
 50. For instance, in Aerial Herbicide Spraying, Ecuador argued that Colom-
bia’s use of toxic herbicides along its border violated Colombia’s obligations “in 
three distinct but interrelated areas of international law: the protection of the 
environment[,] . . . the protection of fundamental human rights, and the protec-
tion of indigenous peoples.” Memorial of Ecuador, Aerial Herbicide Spraying 
(Ecuador v. Colom.), 2009 I.C.J. Pleadings 322, ¶ 9.1 (Apr. 28). 
 51. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances art. 14(2), Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 52. International Sugar Agreement arts. 29–30, Mar. 20, 1992, 1703 
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examples, one regime (the narcotics regime or the sugar regime) 
directly imports and gives priority to norms from two other re-
gimes (i.e., human rights and environmental law). 
However, in numerous other cases, including the one at is-
sue here, the factual relationship (or interdependence) between 
the regimes is not expressly recognized in the treaty, and courts 
will need to resort to other interpretive principles. How they go 
about doing that is discussed further below.53  
B. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REGIME 
The international environmental law (IEL) regime emerged 
out of the functional imperative to address transboundary prob-
lems relating to the environment and natural resource use. Air 
and water pollution, depletion of shared rivers, and conservation 
of migratory species do not respect political boundaries and do 
not lend themselves to domestic solutions. Some of the earliest 
bilateral and multilateral treaties relating to the environment, 
such as the 1866 Treaties of Bayonne between France and 
Spain,54 the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention, or the 1909 
International Boundary Waters Treaty between Canada and the 
United States,55 sought to regulate these types of concerns and 
prevent resource waste or conflict. Indeed, “[m]uch of interna-
tional environmental law has been formulated by reference to 
the impact that activities in one territory may have on the terri-
tory of another.”56 
The law did not originally focus on protecting the environ-
ment as such. The operating logic behind these instruments was 
to prevent negative externalities, overcome coordination prob-
lems, and discourage free-riding—a self-interested attempt to 
maintain an orderly neighborhood. In 1949, for example, when 
the ILC began its work on codifying international law, it pro-
posed addressing the issue of transboundary pollution and re-
source use as part of “obligations of territorial jurisdiction.”57 
 
U.N.T.S. 203. 
 53. See infra Part V.A. 
 54. Traité de délimitation de la frontière entre l’Espagne et la France 
depuis le val d’Andorre jusqu’à la Méditerranée [Treaty on Boundaries Between 
Spain and France from the Valley of Andorra to the Mediterranean], Fr.-Spain, 
May 26, 1866, 1982 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 55. Boundary Waters Treaty, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448. 
 56. Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Ry. (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, ¶ 222 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005). 
 57. Int’l Law Comm’n, Survey of International Law, at 34–35, 61, U.N. Doc. 
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These early arrangements thus reflected the underlying under-
standing—which still animates the entire IEL regime—that 
States’ domestic activities can have negative transboundary con-
sequences that cannot be managed without inter-State coordina-
tion. They also reflected the understanding that the right to ter-
ritorial sovereignty comes with the responsibility to prevent 
transboundary environmental harm.58 
Starting in the 1960s, the growing recognition that human 
activity, population growth, and technological change could have 
significant and potentially irreversible impacts on the environ-
ment—from deforestation and fisheries collapse to risks involv-
ing chemical waste and the loss of biodiversity—spurred the de-
velopment of modern environmental law. In 1971, a survey of the 
law relating to the environment could still fit on just over one 
page, but it was apparent that this area was destined for 
growth.59 As predicted, multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) proliferated after the signing of the watershed 1972 
Stockholm Declaration.60 Today, over 1,300 MEAs and over 
2,200 bilateral environmental agreements cover specific sectors 
(e.g., wetlands), resources (e.g., fisheries), regions (e.g., Antarc-
tica), and pollutants (e.g., ozone-depleting substances).61 
The dense network of environmental treaties, sometimes de-
scribed as “treaty congestion,”62 grew in the shadow of customary 
law, such as the duty to prevent transboundary harm, discussed 
in more detail below,63 and, increasingly, of concepts like the 
 
A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (1949) [hereinafter ILC 1949 Survey]. The ILC proposed dealing 
with exploitation of marine “products” under the “regime of the High Seas.” See 
id. at 40. 
 58. See infra Part IV.C.  
 59. See ILC 1971 Survey, supra note 39, ¶¶ 335–336 (projecting growth of 
this body of law over “the next ten to twenty years” owing to “the growth in 
industrial production, the rising volume of potential harmful agents trans-
ported (for instance oil), the accompanying rise in consumption and the steadily 
increasing figure of world population,” such that “greater attention will have to 
be paid in future to the problems of preserving, or conserving, the environment, 
so as to enable it to continue to support large numbers of people”). 
 60. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 
(June 16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. 
 61. See IEA Database Home, INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS (IEA) DATABASE 
PROJECT, https://iea.uoregon.edu (last visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
 62. Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary 
Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 697–702 
(1993). 
 63. See infra Part IV.A. 
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common heritage of mankind, the precautionary principle, and 
duties owed to future generations. Over time, the logic of envi-
ronmental law thus shifted from managing orderly neighborly 
relations and resource use (which furthered State interests with-
out necessarily being accompanied by environmental conscious-
ness) to environmental stewardship grounded in the duty of pre-
vention and environmental risk-management.64  
By comparison, the basic structure of the legal obligation 
changed little from the earliest treaties to the modern MEAs. 
Even though environmental treaties ultimately benefit the do-
mestic and the global public and the international community as 
a whole, they generally set out a web of reciprocal duties that 
States primarily owe and hold against each other.65 Compliance, 
enforcement, and monitoring mechanisms are predominantly 
horizontal. As with general international law, only States can 
bring complaints for noncompliance, as MEAs do not generally 
confer this right on private parties.66  
Moreover, individual MEAs by and large do not have a ded-
icated adjudicative body to interpret and clarify the content of 
State obligations. They rely on ad hoc adjudication or arbitra-
tion, often by institutions which are set up under adjacent re-
gimes (such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS)) or distant regimes (such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion bodies). The preferred means of compliance under MEAs, 
however, has been through a “managerial”67 treaty-based peer-
review and monitoring process (non-compliance mechanisms), 
 
 64. See generally PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 39, 212 (3d ed. 2009). 
 65. In the literature, MEAs are often described as giving rise to “non-recip-
rocal,” “absolute,” “integral” or “interdependent” obligations. See, e.g., Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, in Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, at 95, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility]; see also id. at 117–
18. (breach of an “integral” obligation necessarily affects all parties).  
As understood in this Article, “reciprocity” underlies environmental trea-
ties to the extent that States parties are the sole rights-holders, duty-bearers, 
and treaty enforcers, and obligations are ultimately due to other States (even 
though the treaty’s purpose and operation may further community interests). 
This does not turn MEAs into bilateral pairs.  
 66. There are a handful of exceptions, but they are not always effective. See, 
e.g., Knox, supra note 23 (discussing individuals’ access to compliance bodies 
under NAFTA, Aarhus, and Espoo Conventions). 
 67. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 230 (1995). 
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which is less interested in establishing State responsibility (and 
liability) for treaty violations and more focused on finding ways 
to make the treaty regime more effective.68 Sidestepping the dif-
ficult issues of State responsibility and liability helped the envi-
ronmental regime grow.69 The downside is that the regime today 
offers few viable options to deal with non-compliant States or to 
obtain individual remedies. 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
If international environmental law emerged largely as a cor-
rective to the problem of cross-border externalities and coordina-
tion, international human rights law emerged as a corrective to 
the problem of the State’s abuses at home—a moral, rather than 
a functional, imperative. Human rights treaties after World War 
II did not evolve primarily to manage free riders or prevent a 
tragedy of the commons.70 They evolved to ensure that States 
would treat their own people with the “minimum standard of civ-
ilization.”71 This goal, one of the pillars of the U.N. Charter,72 led 
to the creation of the Commission on Human Rights in 194673 
 
 68. See generally DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 269 (2010) (contrasting international environ-
mental regimes’ “own sui generis arrangements” with the traditional model of 
invoking State responsibility). 
 69. See Jutta Brunnée, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on Interna-
tional Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection, 53 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 351, 359 (2004) (explaining that the emphasis shifted away from 
articulating rules on State conduct/responsibility to developing treaty-based ap-
proaches for the management of individual environmental concerns (e.g., ozone) 
and civil liability regimes for specific issues (e.g., oil pollution)); see also Boyle, 
supra note 16, at 4. 
 70. However, they were seen as exerting a stabilizing influence on interna-
tional relations. See U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 55, ¶ 1; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] 
(“[D]isregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts.”). 
 71. ILC 1949 Survey, supra note 57, at 47, ¶ 82. 
 72. U.N. Charter pmbl. (expressing determination “to reaffirm faith in fun-
damental human rights”); id. art. 1, ¶ 3 (listing “international cooperation 
in . . . promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamen-
tal freedoms for all” among its purposes). 
 73. The U.N. Secretary-General prepared two studies on U.N. activities in 
this sphere for the 1968 International Conference on Human Rights. See 
Measures Taken Within the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.32/5 (June 20, 1967); Methods Used by the United Nations in the 
Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/6 (June 20, 1967); see also Hu-
man Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the United Nations, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/4 (1967). 
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and the adoption of the Universal Declaration in 1948, followed 
by the Covenants in 1966.74 It also spurred the adoption of vari-
ous other international and regional human rights instruments. 
For a regime that scarcely existed in 1949, human rights quickly 
became a distinct and rapidly growing branch of international 
law. 
Human rights treaties, like environmental treaties, are 
multilateral instruments negotiated among sovereign States. 
They are, however, distinct from multilateral treaties that give 
rise to a network of reciprocal duties among the contracting 
States. The legal commitments States undertake under human 
rights treaties are essentially unilateral. In other words, they 
should not depend on the observance of the rights and duties by 
other States. As the Inter-American Court explained, 
modern human rights treaties in general, and the American Conven-
tion in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type 
concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mu-
tual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the 
protection of the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective 
of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all 
other contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, 
the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within 
which they, for the common good, assume various obligations, not in 
relation to other States, but towards all individuals within their juris-
diction.75 
 
 74.  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. The United 
States signed both Covenants in 1977 and ratified the ICCPR in 1992; it has not 
yet ratified the ICESCR. See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic 
Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 309–310 (2007); see 
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter= 
4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND (last visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
 75. The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 2, ¶ 29 (Sept. 24, 1982) [hereinafter Reservations Ad-
visory Opinion]; see also id. ¶ 27 (“[T]he object and purpose of the [American] 
Convention is not the exchange of reciprocal rights between a limited number 
of States, but the protection of the human rights of all individual human beings 
within the Americas, irrespective of their nationality.”). 
This is consistent with the interpretation adopted by other bodies. See Res-
ervations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28); Austria v. Italy, App. 
No. 788/60 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. Jan. 11, 1961), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i= 
001-115598; Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, ¶ 239 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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The Court noted that “the Convention must be seen for what in 
reality it is; a multilateral legal instrument or framework ena-
bling States to make binding unilateral commitments not to vio-
late the human rights of individuals within their jurisdiction.”76 
The notion of “jurisdiction” is critical here in that it limits the 
scope of State responsibility and the treaty’s spatial applica-
tion—a concept I explore in more detail below.77 The Inter-Amer-
ican Court thus concluded that States Parties can “readily im-
plement[]” their commitments to individuals “without the 
intervention of any other State.”78 Indeed, in human rights law, 
it is widely assumed that “noncompliance by other nations has 
little effect on a nation’s ability to comply.”79 
However, as this Article shows, that assumption does not 
hold up in practice. A State’s unilateral commitments will likely 
fail to protect individuals in its jurisdiction from transboundary 
pollution. Such cases, by definition, require the cooperation and 
commitment of other States—this is the raison d’être of interna-
tional environmental law but is still underappreciated in human 
rights law. Still, the basic point holds: in contrast to the vast ma-
jority of other multilateral instruments, human rights treaties 
 
Jan. 18, 1978), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57506; U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon 
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or 
in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994) (“[Human rights] treaties . . . are not a 
web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endow-
ment of individuals with rights[,] . . . [such that] [t]he principle of inter-State 
reciprocity has no place . . . .”). 
 76. Reservations Advisory Opinion, supra note 75, ¶ 33 (emphasis added). 
 77. See infra Part III. 
 78. Reservations Advisory Opinion, supra note 75, ¶ 32 (emphasis added). 
 79. Bradley, supra note 74, at 332 (emphasis added). The State’s ability to 
comply as a factual matter when other States are not in compliance with a hu-
man rights treaty is distinct from its legal right to retaliate or impose counter-
measures under international law. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 60(5), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 
1980) [hereinafter VCLT] (exempting “treaties of a humanitarian character” 
from the provisions governing termination or suspension of treaty as a result of 
a material breach by the other party). Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
supra note 65, at 129, ¶ 5 (explaining that reciprocal countermeasures for obli-
gations concerning human rights are “inconceivable” as “[t]he obligations in 
question have a non-reciprocal character and are not only due to other States 
but to the individuals themselves”); Fitzmaurice Report, supra note 42, ¶ 91. 
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set out essentially non-reciprocal, vertical duties of States to in-
dividuals subject to their “jurisdiction.”80 The nature of con-
trasting legal obligations in international environmental law 
and international human rights law and their potential intersec-
tion is presented schematically in Figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2. The Nature of State Obligations Under IEL and 
IHRL 
Since individuals are the rights-holders under human rights 
treaties, in some cases State duties will be enforceable through 
a complaints mechanism that confers the right to file claims di-
rectly on individuals, and not merely on other States (as is cus-
tomary under most multilateral instruments). For example, the 
American Convention, signed in 1969 under the aegis of the 
OAS, created a right of individual petition to the Inter-American 
 
 80. See also Knox, supra note 23, at 83 (describing rights that are held by 
individuals against a State other than their own as “diagonal”). 
*Private persons can also have obligations to other private persons across the 
border, as shown with the dotted line. Those kinds of obligations can become 
the subject of transnational civil litigation, discussed in the Introduction. See 
text accompanying notes 11–13. 
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Commission without requiring a special declaration of ac-
ceptance by States Parties—which was unprecedented at the 
time.81  
A number of human rights treaties also provide for an inter-
State complaints process when the rights of one State’s nationals 
are injured by another State. This procedure was not strictly 
needed since an injury to a State’s nationals would already sup-
port a complaint based on customary international law of diplo-
matic protection (independent of any human rights treaty frame-
work).82 The fact that this provision was expressly included—
essentially as a form of peer-to-peer policing—speaks to the im-
portance that States attached to universal compliance with hu-
man rights within their region. This right, however, is infre-
quently exercised.83 At the end of the day, States prefer not to 
embarrass their sovereign peers, or create precedents that could 
be held against them in the future. This heightens the im-
portance of the individual petition process for the enforcement of 
international human rights law. 
D. SUMMARY 
The essential structural features and the logic of the inter-
national human rights and environmental regimes discussed 




 81. ILC 1971 Survey, supra note 39, ¶ 394. 
 82. See Dinah Shelton, Remedies and Reparation, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, su-
pra note 22, at 374. 
 83. For exceptions, see, e.g., Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Interstate Case 01/8, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 11/97 (Mar. 8, 2007); see also Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo v. Burundi, Communication No. 227/99, African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], 33rd Sess. (May 29, 2003); 
Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2011), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-108097. 
ECtHR decisions are available on its official website. See HUDOC, https:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int (last visited Mar. 27, 2019). Other human rights decisions 
can be found at Human Rights Library, U. MINN., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
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Table 1. Structural Features and Logic of IHRL and IEL:  
A Comparison 
 
Given these significant structural differences and the dis-
tinct logics through which these two regimes have developed, one 
could argue that international environmental and human rights 
law exist on two different planes. However, these regimes have 
increasingly come into contact over the past few decades thanks 
to the growing awareness of the impacts of environmental deg-
radation. The seemingly different planes on which these regimes 
exist have merged in the Anthropocene. These growing points of 
intersection and convergence—the regime nexus—are the sub-
ject of the next section.  
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II. THE REGIME NEXUS  
Despite their parallel evolution along two separate tracks, 
the human rights and the environmental regimes intersect in a 
number of important ways. Decades of environmental degrada-
tion have imperiled the lives and livelihoods of numerous people 
and communities, such that a healthy environment is increas-
ingly seen as a prerequisite for the fulfilment of human rights. 
This Part provides an overview of the growing recognition of the 
nexus in international law (Part II.A), focusing on the jurispru-
dence of international human rights tribunals (Part II.B). 
A. REGIME NEXUS IN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
The importance of environmental protection to human 
rights is now increasingly acknowledged in national constitu-
tions and in international instruments, including resolutions of 
the U.N. General Assembly84 and the Human Rights Council 
(HRC),85 the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change,86 as well 
as in a growing number of decisions of international human 
 
 84. See, e.g., Stockholm Declaration, supra note 60, princ. 1; G.A. Res. 37/7, 
World Charter for Nature (Oct. 28, 1982) [hereinafter World Charter for Na-
ture]; G.A. Res. 45/94, Need to Ensure a Healthy Environment for the Wellbeing 
of Individuals (Dec. 14, 1990); U.N. Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/ 
CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
 85. Both the HRC and its predecessor, the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR), have considered this issue. As early as 1994, a U.N. report con-
cluded that environmental rights already formed part of human rights law and 
recommended adoption of principles on human rights and the environment. See 
Fatma Zohra Ksentini (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environ-
ment), Human Rights and the Environment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 
(July 6, 1994). No action was taken on the principles, but the CHR remained 
engaged on the issue.  
Since its creation in 2006, the HRC has also enacted a number of nexus-
related resolutions, including on climate change. See, e.g., Human Rights Coun-
cil Res. 16/11, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/11 (Apr. 12, 2011) (“[M]any 
forms of environmental damage are transnational in character and . . . effective 
international cooperation to address such damage is important in order to sup-
port national efforts for the realization of human rights.”). The HRC appointed 
an independent expert in 2012. Human Rights Council Res. 19/10, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/19/L.8/Rev.1, at 2 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
 86. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Par-
ties, Twenty-First Session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016). 
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rights tribunals.87 However, as noted above, the legal implica-
tions of this nexus have yet to be theorized in the literature and 
explored in international practice. 
While this Article focuses on the uptake of environmental 
norms by the human rights regime, the normative flow between 
the two regimes is not unidirectional. Human rights norms have 
also been seeping into the design and structure of international 
environmental agreements. Many environmental instruments, 
for example, expressly list the protection of public health88 and 
responsibilities owed to future generations89 among their objec-
tives. Moreover, international environmental law increasingly 
relies on procedural duties relating to access to information, pub-
lic participation, and remedies—duties that are central to the 
human rights regime—for enforcement and compliance.90  
 
 87. See generally OHCHR Report, supra note 26; see also Office of the High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, The Relationship Between Climate Change and Hu-
man Rights, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009) (“While the universal 
human rights treaties do not refer to a specific right to a safe and healthy envi-
ronment, the [U.N.] human rights treaty bodies all recognize the intrinsic link 
between the environment and the realization of a range of human rights, such 
as the right to life, to health, to food, to water, and to housing.”). For scholarly 
treatments of the nexus, see, e.g., DONALD K. ANTON & DINAH L. SHELTON, EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011); HUMAN RIGHTS AP-
PROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. An-
derson eds., 1996); Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A 
Reassessment, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 471 (2007); Dinah Shelton, Human 
Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment, 28 STANF. J. INT’L. 
L. 103 (1991). 
 88. See, e.g., Minamata Convention on Mercury, pmbl., art. 1, Oct. 10, 2013, 
55 I.L.M 586; 1999 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transbound-
ary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level 
Ozone pmbl., art. 2, Nov. 30, 1999, 2319 U.N.T.S. 81. 
 89. See U.N. Secretary-General, Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs 
of Future Generations, ¶¶ 33–36, U.N. Doc. A/68/322 (Aug. 15, 2013) (listing 
examples). 
 90. Two recent conventions extend these procedural rights to affected per-
sons in other States. See 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assess-
ment in a Transboundary Context art. 2(6), Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 
(entered into force on Sept. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Espoo Convention]; Conven-
tion on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Ac-
cess to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature June 25, 1998, 
2161 U.N.T.S. 450 (entered into force Oct. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Aarhus Con-
vention]; see also Rio Declaration, supra note 84, princ. 10; Boyle, supra note 
11, at 623–26 (explaining that the Aarhus Convention’s design and structure is 
closer to human rights treaty-monitoring bodies than noncompliance proce-
dures in other MEAs). 
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B. THE NEXUS JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 
The first generation of human rights instruments, adopted 
in the 1940s and 60s, preceded the dawn of modern international 
environmental law. Unsurprisingly, it did not acknowledge the 
link between a healthy environment and fulfilment of human 
rights. A number of instruments adopted after the 1972 Stock-
holm Declaration, on the other hand, recognize this nexus,91 as 
do many post-1972 national constitutions. Today, for example, a 
majority of the world’s national constitutions include environ-
mental protections.92 
International tribunals, however, have recognized the exist-
ence of the nexus even when interpreting the first-generation 
human rights treaties, on the theory that they are “living instru-
ments” capable of evolution.93 As the Inter-American Commis-
sion observed, 
[a]lthough the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
and the American Convention on Human Rights make no express ref-
erence to protection of the environment[,] . . . a healthy environment is 
a necessary precondition for exercise of a number of fundamental 
rights, which are profoundly affected by the degradation of natural re-
sources. The Commission’s interpretation is that both the Declaration 
and the American Convention reflect a priority concern with the 
preservation of individual health and welfare, legal interests which are 
protected by the interrelation between the rights to life, security of per-
son, physical, psychological and moral integrity, and health, and 
 
 91. See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 24, June 27, 
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African 
Charter] (“All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment 
favourable to their development.”); Additional Protocol to the American Con-
vention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
art. 11, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999) [here-
inafter Protocol of San Salvador] (“Right to a Healthy Environment. 1. Everyone 
shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic 
public services. 2. The States Parties shall promote the protection, preservation, 
and improvement of the environment.”); Convention on the Rights of the Child 
art. 24(2)(c), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sep. 2, 1990) 
[hereinafter CRC] (directing States Parties to “take appropriate measures” to 
“combat disease and malnutrition, . . . taking into consideration the dangers 
and risks of environmental pollution”). 
 92. See DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A 
GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 92 
(2012). This is a rapid increase since 1994, when less than seventy countries 
had constitutional protections for the environment. OHCHR Report, supra note 
26, ¶ 30. Whether the increasing constitutionalization of environmental rights, 
as evidence of State practice, points to the customary law status of the right to 
a healthy environment is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 93. See infra notes 291–92 and accompanying text. 
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thereby refer to the right to a healthy environment.94 
This statement encapsulates the essence of regime congruence: 
one regime requires compliance with another to thrive. 
In the Americas, there is a growing corpus of nexus juris-
prudence, in which Inter-American human rights institutions 
have had to grapple with the problem of environmental degrada-
tion. The Inter-American Court, for example, has emphasized 
the “undeniable link between the protection of the environment 
and the enjoyment of other human rights,”95 particularly in the 
context of indigenous rights.96 Across petitions, requests for pre-
cautionary measures, contentious cases, and thematic hearings 
over the last decade, the Inter-American Court and the Inter-
American Commission have been asked to address a wide range 
of environmental issues. This has included large-scale infra-
structure projects, such as the construction of hydroelectric 
dams,97 the Nicaragua Canal,98 and the Dakota Access Pipe-
line,99 as well as natural resource exploitation, including logging, 
 
 94. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Second Report on the Situation of Human 
Rights Defenders in the Americas, ¶ 309, OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 66 (Dec. 31, 2011) 
(emphasis added). 
 95. Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 196, ¶ 148 (Apr. 3, 2009). 
 96. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 
(Aug. 31, 2001); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 163–167 (June 17, 
2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 118–121 (Mar. 29, 
2006); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 121–123, 
126–129, 146 (Nov. 28, 2007); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecua-
dor, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245,  
¶ 174 (June 27, 2012); Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí v. Panama, Case 
12.354, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 125/12 (2012); see also Yanomami 
v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10, rev. 
1 (1985). 
 97. See, e.g., Indigenous Communities of Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Precautionary Measure No. 382/10 (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/protection/precautionary.asp#382/10. 
An appeal was also submitted in 2012 on behalf of communities harmed by dam 
construction in the Chixoy River Basin.  
 98. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE 154TH SESSION 
(2015), http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/docs/Report-154.pdf. 
 99. Request for Precautionary Measures Pursuant to Article 25 of the 
IACHR Rules of Procedure Concerning Serious and Urgent Risks of Irreparable 
Harm Arising Out of Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R. (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/12/09/ 
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mining, and oil concessions,100 toxic spills,101 lead poisoning,102 
gas explosion risk,103 deforestation,104 and climate change.105 In 
particular, both institutions have focused on the rights to life 
(Article 1), health/personal security (Article 5), access to infor-
mation (Article 13), (indigenous) property (Article 21), and effec-
tive remedies (Article 25) under the Convention and similar 
rights in the Declaration. 
The Inter-American system is not alone in this regard. On 
the regional level, the European Court of Human Rights (Euro-
pean Court or ECtHR) has the most extensive environmental 
record. Over the past two decades, the European Court has been 
asked to address a wide range of scenarios, including hazardous 
 
document_pm_03.pdf. 
 100. See, e.g., Kuna Indigenous People, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
125/12, ¶¶ 236–240; Kichwa People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 174; 
Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 130, 154; see also 
Communities of Maya People, Guatemala, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Precaution-
ary Measure No. 260-07 (May 20, 2010). See generally Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural 
Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights Sys-
tem, ¶¶ 190–191, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09 (Dec. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Indig-
enous Rights]. 
 101. Cmty. of San Mateo de Huanchor v. Peru, Petition 504/03, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n. H.R., Report No. 69/04, ¶ 66 (2004). 
 102.  300 Inhabitants of Puerto Nuevo, Peru, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Pre-
cautionary Measure No. 199/09 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/ 
decisions/precautionary.asp. 
 103. Inhabitants of Cmty. of Omoa, Honduras, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Pre-
cautionary Measure No. 17/1 (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/ 
decisions/precautionary.asp. 
 104. Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 19, 2006); Maya Indigenous Cmty. of 
Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, 
¶¶ 145–147 (Oct. 12, 2004). 
 105. The Commission has received two climate petitions to date. It summar-
ily denied in 2006 the petition from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference against 
the United States on the grounds that the information provided did not enable 
a determination of “whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a vio-
lation of rights protected by the American Declaration.” Letter from Assistant 
Exec. Sec’y Ariel E. Dulitzky, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, to Petition-
ers (Nov. 16, 2006), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/ 
16commissionletter.pdf. The second petition is pending. See PETITION FROM 
ARCTIC ATHABASKAN COUNCIL, SEEKING RELIEF FROM RAPID ARCTIC WARMING 
AND MELTING CAUSED BY EMISSIONS OF BLACK CARBON BY CANADA (2013), 
https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/AAC_PETITION_13-04-23a.pdf. 
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industrial activities,106 nuclear radiation,107 exposure to mus-
tard and nerve gas,108 asbestos exposure,109 arsenic poisoning,110 
 
 106. See, e.g., Öneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79 (methane 
explosion at waste site). 
 107. See, e.g., L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23413/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
June 9, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58176 (radiation due to nu-
clear tests in 1950s); McGinley v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 218725/93, 
23414/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 
-58175 (potential exposure to radiation during atmospheric nuclear tests in 
1950–60s); Athanassoglou v. Switzerland [GC], 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173 (op-
eration of nuclear power-plant); Balmer-Schafroth v. Switzerland, App. No. 
50495/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sep. 13, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 
-21943 (same). 
 108. Roche v. United Kingdom, 2005-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 87.  
 109. Brincat v. Malta, App. Nos. 60908/11, 52110/11, 62129/11, 62312/11, 
62338/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 24, 2014); Moor v. Switzerland, App. Nos. 
52067/10, 41072/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 11, 2014) (in French). 
 110. Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 19, 1998), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58135 (toxic emissions and arsenic poisoning from 
industrial fertilizer plant).  
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industrial pollution,111 electromagnetic radiation,112 natural dis-
asters,113 oil spills,114 dam construction,115 land-use permit-
ting,116 waste disposal,117 water pollution,118 vehicle emis-
sions,119 and noise pollution.120 In those cases where the 
 
 111. López Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90 (Eur. Ct. H.R Dec. 9, 1994), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57905 (pollution from waste-treatment 
plant); Taşkın v. Turkey, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 179 (pollution from gold mine); 
Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 255 (toxic emissions from steel 
plant); Okyay v. Turkey, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R 125 (air pollution from thermal 
power plants); Öçkan v. Turkey, App. No. 46771/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R Mar. 28, 2006), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72910; Ledyayeva v. Russia, App. No. 
53157/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R Oct. 26, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 
-77688 (steel plant); Giacomelli v. Italy, 2006-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 345 (pollution 
and risks from treatment of toxic industrial waste); Lemke v. Turkey, App. No. 
17381/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R June, 5 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 
-80859 (gold mine); Tătar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 27, 
2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90909 (emissions of toxic fumes from 
gold mine and discharge of cyanide-contaminated tailings water); Băcilă v. Ro-
mania, App. No. 19234/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 30, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe 
.int/eng?i=001-98001 (pollution from chemical factory); Dubetska v. Ukraine, 
App. No. 30499/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 10, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-103273 (environmental effects from coal mine and factory); Apanase-
wicz v. Poland, App. No. 6854/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 3, 2011), http://hudoc 
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104672 (environmental and health effects from concrete 
plant); Koceniak v. Poland, App. No. 1733/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June, 17, 2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145668 (impact from slaughterhouse and 
meat-processing plant); Smaltini v. Italy, App. No. 43961/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 
7, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-127699 (health impacts of expo-
sure to steel plant emissions); Cordella v. Italy, App. No. 54414/13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Jan. 24, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-189421 (emissions from steel 
plant). 
 112. Luginbühl v. Switzerland, App. No. 42756/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 17, 
2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72459. 
 113. Murillo Saldias v. Spain, App. No. 76973/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 28, 
2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-2963 (flooding at campsite); Buda-
yeva v. Russia, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267 (mudslide); Kolyadenko v. Russia, App. 
No. 17423/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 
-109283 (flash flooding); Viviani v. Italy, App. No. 9713/13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 
16, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-154058 (risk of volcano eruption); 
Özel v. Turkey, App. No. 14350/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 17, 2015), http://hudoc 
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158803 (earthquake). 
 114. Vilnes v. Norway, App. No. 52806/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 5, 2013), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-138597 (impacts on deep sea divers during North 
Sea oil exploration); Mangouras v. Spain, 2010-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 317 (discharge 
of fuel oil in the Atlantic). 
 115. G. v. Norway, App. No. 9278/81, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1983) (hydroelec-
tric power-plant); Gorraiz Lizarraga v. Spain, 2004-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 255 (pro-
posed flooding of nature reserves and villages for dam construction); Ahunbay 
v. Turkey (Communicated Case), App. No. 6080/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 21, 
2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-11251. 
 116. Fredin v. Sweden, 192 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991) (revocation of license 
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to operate gravel pit); Pine Valley Devs. Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 12742/87 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Nov. 29, 1991), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57711 (withdrawal 
of construction permit); Kyrtatos v. Greece, 2003-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 (property 
development in wetland); Papastavrou v. Greece, 2003-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 (re-
forestation of disputed plot of land); Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia, App. 
No. 57829/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 27, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press? 
i=003-1013988-1048313 (construction on coastal dunes); Kapsalis v. Greece, 
App. No. 20937/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-66878 (construction on protected land); N.A. v. Turkey, 2005-X Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 73 (annulment of property registration and order to demolish hotel lo-
cated on seashore); Valico S.R.L. v. Italy, 2006-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 397 (fine for 
construction in breach of environmental rules); Hamer v. Belgium, 2007-V Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 73 (order to demolish home built without permit and restore land); 
Turgut v. Turkey, App. No. 1411/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2008) http://hudoc 
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87441 (order to register land as public forest); L’Era-
blière A.S.B.L. v. Belgium, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 377 (permit to expand waste-
collection site); Depalle v. France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 233 (order to demolish 
home to protect coastal areas); Brosset-Triboulet v. France, App. No. 34078/02 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 29, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-98036 (same); 
Andersson v. Sweden, App. No. 64712/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 28, 2014), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67018 (permit to construct railway); Malfatto v. 
France, App. No. 40886/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-166949 (denial of construction permit on protected land). 
 117. Brânduşe v. Romania, App. No. 6586/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 7, 2009), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2698080-2947397 (pollution and nui-
sance from waste site); Di Sarno v. Italy, App. No. 30765/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-108480 (failure to collect and treat waste); 
Locascia v. Italy, App. No. 35648/10 (Communicated Case) (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 
23, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-118326 (operation of private 
waste-disposal plant).  
 118. Zander v. Sweden, App. No. 14282/88, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 25, 1993) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57862 (water pollution from industrial 
waste); Dzemyuk v. Ukraine, App. No. 42488/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146357 (contamination of water supply 
from cemetery construction). 
 119. Greenpeace E.V. v. Germany, App. No. 18215/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 12, 
2009). 
 120. Powell v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9310/81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 21, 
1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57622 (noise levels at Heathrow); 
Hatton v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 189 (disturbance from night 
flights at Heathrow); Deés v. Hungary, App. No. 2345/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 
2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-101647 (road-traffic noise); Grim-
kovskaya v. Ukraine, App. No. 38182/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 21, 2011), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105746 (same); Flamenbaum v. France, App. No. 
3675/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 
-115143 (noise disturbance to nature reserve and private property from airport 
extension); Bor v. Hungary, App. No. 50474/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 18, 2013), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-120959 (railway noise); Vecbaštika v. Lat-
via, App. No. 52499/11 (Communicated Case) (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-147757 (noise from wind energy farms); 
Cuenca Zarzoso v. Spain, App. No. 23383/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 16, 2018), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-180296 (night-time noise). 
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claimants prevailed, the European Court has found violations of 
the rights to life (Article 2), respect for private and family life 
(Article 8), access to justice and remedies (Articles 6 and 13), in-
formation (Article 10), and peaceful enjoyment of one’s posses-
sions (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1).121 The Court’s jurisprudence 
on environmental matters is so extensive, as Alan Boyle has 
written, that proposals for the adoption of an environmental pro-
tocol have not been pursued.122  
Within the African human rights system, the African Com-
mission has addressed oil extraction, mining, and logging on in-
digenous land, articulating substantive and procedural stand-
ards relating to benefit-sharing and community rights.123 Unlike 
other human rights treaties, the African Charter expressly pro-
tects the right to a healthy environment,124 which gives the Af-
rican institutions an express textual basis to consider the regime 
nexus.125 Other international treaty bodies have also been called 
upon to consider the nexus cases. For example, the UNHRC has 
encountered a range of environment-related issues under the IC-
CPR, including storage of radioactive waste near residential ar-
eas,126 nuclear weapons deployment,127 highway construction,128 
as well as natural resource exploitation on indigenous land.129 
 
 121. See COE MANUAL, supra note 15. 
 122. See Boyle, supra note 87, at 485. 
 123. See Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria (Ogoniland), Communi-
cation No. 155/96, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights [Afr. 
Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶ 51–53, 67–68 (Oct. 2001), http://www.achpr.org/files/ 
sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf; Ctr. for Minority 
Rights Dev. v. Kenya, Communication No. 276/03, African Commission on Hu-
man and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.] (Nov. 2009), http://www.achpr 
.org/files/sessions/46th/communications/276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf. 
 124. See supra note 91. 
 125. See Ogoniland, Communication No. 155/96, ¶¶ 51–53. 
 126. Kennedy v. Trinidad & Tobago, Commc’n No. 845/1999, U.N. Human 
Rights Comm., ¶¶ 6–12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (1999); E.H.P. v. Ca-
nada, Commc’n No. 67/1980, U.N. Human Rights Comm., at 20, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984).  
 127. E.W. v. Netherlands, Commc’n. No. 429/1990, U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., ¶ 3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/429/1990 (1993). 
 128. Dahanayake v. Sri Lanka, Commc’n. No. 1331/2004, U.N. Human 
Rights Comm., ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1331/2004 (2006). 
 129. E.P. v. Colombia, Commc’n No. 318/1988, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/318/1988 (1990) (impact of development on islands’ eco-
system and traditional economy); Ominayak v. Canada, Commc’n No. 167/1984, 
U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) (1990) (impact of 
fossil-fuel extraction on applicants’ traditional economy); Sara v. Finland, 
Commc’n No. 431/1990, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. 
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These cases have rarely reached the merits. Where it found a 
violation, the UNHRC has focused on procedural rights, such as 
the right to effective consultation, and minority and indigenous 
rights (Article 27).130 
C. SUMMARY  
On the whole, international human rights law has become 
considerably “greener” over time as tribunals have increasingly 
had to address the impacts of environmental degradation. The 
older human rights treaties did not contemplate the regime 
nexus, but changing facts on the ground have moved courts to 
adjust their interpretation. Today, the jurisprudence makes 
clear that State failure to prevent or manage environmental deg-
radation can constitute a human rights violation. This includes 
both substantive rights (e.g., to life, health, private and family 
life, and property) and procedural rights (e.g., to information, 
participation, and access to justice). 
Accepting that a healthy environment is a precondition for 
the fulfillment of a range of human rights,131 courts have estab-
lished that States do not merely have a negative duty to abstain 
from causing harm. They also have a positive duty to protect in-
dividuals from environmental risks through regulation, monitor-
ing, and enforcement of environmental law. As this body of law 
suggests, States can incur international responsibility under hu-
man rights treaties where they fail to regulate or control the 
source of environmental harm;132 where they fail to manage se-
 
CCPR/C/50/D/431/1990 (1994) (logging and construction on Sami lands); Läns-
man v. Finland, Commc’n No. 511/1992, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994) (stone quarry impact on reindeer-herding); Poma 
Poma v. Peru, Commc’n No. 1457/2006, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (2009) (water diversion and land degradation in llama-
raising community). 
 130. See, e.g., Poma Poma, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1457/2006; Ominayak, 
U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40).  
 131. See supra note 95. 
 132. See, e.g., Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 155, ¶¶ 89–
90 (“The positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life . . . en-
tails above all a primary duty on the State to put in place a legislative and ad-
ministrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats 
to the right to life,” including safeguards, licensing, and preventive measures to 
manage risks, such as the public’s right to information); Fadeyeva v. Russia, 
2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 255, 282 ¶ 89 (“[T]he State’s responsibility in environ-
mental cases may arise from a failure to regulate private industry.”). 
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rious environmental risks, including by conducting a prior envi-
ronmental impact assessment (EIA) and putting in place the 
necessary safeguards;133 where they fail to consult or disclose to 
the public information regarding environmental risks;134 where 
they fail to enforce environmental regulations;135 and where they 
fail to give the affected public access to remedies.136  
There is an important caveat. Judicial recognition of the 
nexus between a healthy environment and respect for human 
rights has largely been limited to the domestic context—cases 
where both the cause of the environmental harm and its alleged 
human rights effects are located within the territory of a single 
State. To date, no international tribunal has addressed the ex-
traterritorial application of human rights treaties in the envi-
ronmental context in a contentious proceeding, and Ecuador’s 
claim against Colombia in the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)—which could 
have clarified this important area—has been abandoned.137  
 
 133. See, e.g., Kichwa People of Sarayuko v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 205–207 (June 27, 2012); Saramaka People v. Su-
riname (Interpretation), Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, ¶¶ 40–
41 (Aug. 12, 2008); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 130–131 (Mar. 29, 2006) (defining procedural safe-
guards for natural resource projects on indigenous peoples’ territories); Maya 
Indigenous Cmty. of Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶¶ 145–147 (Oct. 12, 2004); see also Grimkovskaya v. 
Ukraine, App. No. 38182/03, ¶¶ 67–69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 21, 2011). 
 134. See, e.g., Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 151, ¶ 103 (Sept. 19, 2006) (finding a violation of the right to receive infor-
mation about environmental impacts); cf. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10 rev.1, ch. 
VIII (Apr. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Ecuador Report] (emphasizing the importance 
of procedural rights). See also La Oroya Cmty. v. Peru, Petition 1473-06, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 76/09, ¶ 75 (2009); Kichwa People, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 174–177; Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, ¶ 60 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Feb. 19, 1998).  
 135. See, e.g., Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi v. Panama, Case 
12.354, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 125/12, ¶¶ 278–282 (2012); see also 
Giacomelli v. Italy, 2006-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 345, 366, ¶¶ 93–94. 
 136. See id.; see also Ecuador Report, supra note 134 (“[P]rotection of the 
right to life and physical integrity may best be advanced through measures to 
support and enhance the ability of individuals to safeguard and vindicate those 
rights.”). These procedural obligations have been particularly influential in the 
European context. See generally Boyle, supra note 87, at 494–97. See also 
Taşkin v. Turkey, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 208, ¶ 127, 210, ¶ 137.  
 137. Memorial of Ecuador, Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.), 
2009 I.C.J. Pleadings 1, ¶ 9.9 (Apr. 28). 
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However, as of February 2018, there is an advisory opinion 
that addresses this issue head-on. In 2016, Colombia had asked 
the Inter-American Court to clarify whether States could incur 
responsibility for environmental harm under the American Con-
vention, specifically in the Wider Caribbean Region.138 In its 
seminal ruling, the Court advised that they could.139 In other 
words, if pollution can travel across the border, so can legal re-
sponsibility. The Court explained that States must take steps to 
prevent significant environmental harm not only to individuals 
inside, but also outside their territory.140 Many central elements 
of the Advisory Opinion remain to be clarified in future litiga-
tion,141 but the recognition of the regime nexus in the Americas 
is no longer in doubt. 
In addition, even if direct precedents on this issue are lack-
ing, judicial guidance is not. As I explain in the next Part, tribu-
nals have drawn the outer boundaries of human rights treaties 
in a number of other circumstances (not involving the environ-
ment). That jurisprudence can help us determine whether, and 
to what extent, courts’ approach to extraterritoriality could in-
form future cases arising at the nexus of the regimes on the en-
vironment and human rights.  
III. REGIME LIMITS: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES  
As explained above, human rights treaties were not drafted 
with environmental or transboundary issues in mind. They were 
designed to regulate the relationship between the State and its 
own people. As such, they generally require States Parties to re-
spect and ensure the protected rights and freedoms within their 
“territory” and/or subject to their “jurisdiction.”142 The existence 
 
 138. See supra note 18. 
 139. Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 19. 
 140. While Colombia’s request focused on the Wider Caribbean Region, the 
Court discussed general obligations applicable to all States subject to the Amer-
ican Convention. Id. ¶ 126. 
 141. See Banda, supra note 19. 
 142. See American Convention, supra note 33, art. 1(1) (“The States Parties 
to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized 
herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full 
exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of 
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”) (emphasis added); 
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of this relationship is a threshold condition that claimants must 
meet before their application can be examined on the merits.  
Not all human rights instruments expressly limit the scope 
of State obligations through a jurisdictional clause.143 For exam-
ple, on their face, instruments on economic, social, and cultural 
rights are less territorially constraining than those on civil and 
political rights—and even obligate States to engage in interna-
tional cooperation and assistance.144 However, even such osten-
sibly boundless treaties in practice tend to be territorially 
bound—either by virtue of the tribunals’ interpretation,145 or by 
express treaty provisions setting up a complaints mechanism 
(which usually contains a jurisdictional clause).146  
 
see also ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Cov-
enant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other sta-
tus.”) (emphasis added); European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (“The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms de-
fined in Section I of this Convention.”) (emphasis added); International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 6, Dec. 21, 
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD] (“States Parties shall assure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the 
competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of 
racial discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms 
contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just 
and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of 
such discrimination.”) (emphasis added); CRC, supra note 91, art. 2(1) (“States 
Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention 
to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination . . . .”) (emphasis 
added).  
 143. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 70; ICESCR, supra note 74; American Dec-
laration, supra note 34; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
CEDAW]; African Charter, supra note 91. Specific articles, however, may con-
tain limiting terms. See Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 91, art. 10 (ex-
pressly limiting the duty to extend health services). 
 144. GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 8, 13. 
 145. The Inter-American Commission has read a jurisdictional limitation 
into the American Declaration. See Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 37 
(1999). The practice of other international bodies tasked with interpreting trea-
ties that frame State obligations in universal terms is similar. See DEN HEIJER, 
supra note 22, at 51–52. 
 146. Optional Protocols (permitting individual complaints against the State) 
to CEDAW, ICESCR, CRC, and ICERD are all limited by a jurisdictional clause. 
See GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 59. As Milanovic emphasizes, such 
clauses in optional protocols do not affect the scope of State obligations under 
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The scope of State obligations under human rights treaties 
is territorially limited because a State’s jurisdictional compe-
tence under general international law is also “primarily territo-
rial.”147 In general international law, the territorial nature of 
State jurisdiction reflects the fundamental principles of sover-
eign equality148 and nonintervention in matters that are “essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction” of other States.149 In 
other words, every State has authority to regulate or proscribe 
conduct and enforce domestic laws within its own sovereign ter-
ritory, but not beyond.150  
In the context of human rights, this means that every State 
must implement its treaty obligations within its jurisdiction. 
The State is not asked to “ensure” or “secure” human rights out-
side its territory because doing so could impermissibly extend 
the reach of its authority or rules into its neighbors’ jurisdiction. 
The United States, for example, cannot grant or enforce personal 
freedoms in other countries, though it can use diplomatic means 
to encourage their protection. After all, a human rights treaty 
“does not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor does 
it purport to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to 
 
the treaty, but they do limit the treaty’s reach in practice by creating a 
standalone condition for admissibility. MILANOVIC, supra note 22, at 11–13. 
 147. Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 351–52, ¶¶ 59–61. 
 148. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of 
the sovereign equality of all its Members.”). 
 149. Id. art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall author-
ize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.”); cf. Con-
vention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered 
into force Dec. 26, 1934) (Montevideo Convention). 
 150. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 
9) (“Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essen-
tial foundation of international relations.”); see also Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 263 (June 27) (recognizing “the fundamental principle of State sov-
ereignty on which the whole of international law rests”); Island of Palmas (Neth. 
v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (“Sovereignty in the relations 
between States signifies independence. Independence in relation to a portion of 
the globe is the right to exercise therein to the exclusion of any other state, the 
functions of the State.”); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 
18 (Sept. 7) (“[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—
it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.”). 
This principle also underlies U.S. practice. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS §§ 402–403 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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impose [its] standards on other States.”151  
But this does not mean that a State’s duty to protect human 
rights ends at its border. International courts have recognized a 
number of circumstances in which human rights treaties apply 
extraterritorially. Extraterritorial application in this context 
means that a State may incur duties even though the claimant, 
at the moment of the injury, was not in the territory of that 
State. Delineating the precise scope of that duty and the circum-
stances under which it applies has proven challenging. There is 
a rich literature on this general subject, which I do not propose 
to duplicate here.152  
What is most relevant for present purposes is that human 
rights case law has been ad hoc, fact-driven, and inconsistent in 
its treatment of extraterritorial harm.153 This makes it harder to 
isolate a set of principles that might govern a case where cross-
border pollution injures a local community’s health or sources of 
livelihood. Part of the problem is that human rights courts have 
tended to import notions of jurisdiction from general interna-
tional law to interpret the term “jurisdiction” in human rights 
conventions.154 The concept of jurisdiction in human rights law 
serves to define the pool of persons whose rights a State must 
respect or secure.155 By contrast, in general international law, 
the term “jurisdiction” serves to define the limits of State author-
ity to regulate the conduct of persons through its domestic law.156 
In other words, in the former, it is used to impute sovereign re-
sponsibility, while in the latter it is used to restrain the exercise 
of sovereign power.157 By conflating the two concepts, courts 
have in some cases absolved wrongdoing States of their respon-
sibility.  
 
 151. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 170, ¶ 141. 
 152. See supra note 22. 
 153. For a concise critique, see Al-Skeini, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 189–93, 
¶¶ 4–20 (Bonello, J., concurring). See infra Part III.A–D. 
 154. The two concepts, though related, are not identical. See generally MILA-
NOVIC, supra note 22, at 8 (explaining that the concept of jurisdiction in human 
rights treaties is about actual exercise of control and authority over a territory 
or persons, while title or sovereignty are about establishing a right in interna-
tional law to exercise such authority within a specific territory); see also id. at 
22–27, 30–33, 39–41, 62. 
 155. Cf. DEN HEIJER, supra note 22, at 26. 
 156. See MILANOVIC, supra note 22, at 23. 
 157. See GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 24. 
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Where does this leave us in terms of State obligations at the 
regime nexus? This Part reviews the case law to identify the 
dominant extraterritoriality approaches, or tests, and determine 
whether any existing test would recognize regime congruence in 
cases involving transboundary harm. As I explain in Parts III.A–
III.C below, we can distill three different tests that courts have 
used to decide issues of extraterritoriality: effective control (over 
a territory); physical control (over a person); and direct effects.158 
As I show, courts have not yet expressly acknowledged or em-
braced the existence of the third approach. Yet it is precisely this 
emerging, minority approach that would allow a court to hear 
claims arising out of transboundary environmental harm (Part 
III.D). However, this approach also risks being limitless and 
therefore requires further guidance (Part III.E).  
A. THE EFFECTIVE CONTROL TEST  
The effective control test has developed out of situations in-
volving occupation by one State of the national territory of an-
other State as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military ac-
tion.159 The historical record of violations of State sovereignty is 
sizeable, and so is the jurisprudence applying the effective con-
 
 158. For a typology, see Al-Skeini, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 166–70, ¶¶ 130–
140. The literature is not unanimous in its understanding of the tests. See, e.g., 
DEN HEIJER, supra note 22, at 29, 48 (discussing two models (control over for-
eign territory and control over persons) and noting a third category “may de-
velop . . . in which the State, also in the absence of an assertion of control or 
authority over a person in a foreign territory, may . . . incur positive duties vis-
à-vis that individual”); GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 25–26 (describing a 
spectrum of approaches from control-based to facticity-based tests); MILANOVIC, 
supra note 22, at 46–51 (discussing two models (spatial and personal) and pro-
posing a third model that would distinguish between positive obligations (if 
there is effective control over territory) and negative obligations (which would 
be territorially unbound)). 
 159. A subset of cases has also involved the exercise of control or “decisive 
influence” by one State over another State’s armed forces, public authorities, or 
local administration. See Al-Skeini, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 167–68, ¶¶ 133–
137. 
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trol test. Courts have examined, inter alia, South Africa’s occu-
pation of Namibia,160 Turkey’s invasion of Northern Cyprus,161 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,162 Uganda’s activities in the Congo,163 
Russia’s influence in Moldova and Georgia,164 Israel’s occupation 
of Palestine,165 NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia,166 and U.S. oper-
ations in Central America167 and in the war on terror.168  
 
 160. See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South-Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 118 (June 21) (“[The occu-
pying power] remains accountable for any violations of its international 
obligations, or of the rights of the people of Namibia . . . because [p]hysical con-
trol of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State 
liability for acts affecting other States.”); see also id. ¶ 122 (“[C]ertain general 
conventions such as those of a humanitarian character, the non-performance of 
which may adversely affect the people of Namibia,” continue to apply). 
 161. See, e.g., Manitaras v. Turkey, App. No. 54591/00, ¶¶ 26–28 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. June 3, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87232; Loizidou v. Tur-
key, App. No. 15318/89, ¶¶ 62–63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 1996), http://hudoc 
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58007. 
 162. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Rep. of the Human Rights Comm. on 
Its Forty-Sixth Session, ¶ 652, U.N. Doc. A/46/40 (1991) (Iraq chapter). 
 163. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 179 (Dec. 19) (“[The occupying power 
bears] responsibility . . . both for any acts of its military that violated its inter-
national obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of hu-
man rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the 
occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account.”); see also 
id. ¶¶ 178, 248. 
 164. See Application of International Convention on Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Order on Provisional Measures, 
2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 149 (Oct. 15); see also Georgia v. Russia (No. 2), App. No. 
38263/08, ¶¶ 65–67 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-108097; Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 282, ¶¶ 392–
394. 
 165. See Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 109 (July 9) (finding that 
Israel’s exercise of territorial control over Palestine engaged its responsibilities 
under human rights treaties); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding 
Observations on Israel, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 
2003). 
 166. See Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
 167. See, e.g., Salas v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 31/93, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85, doc. 9 rev. ¶ 1 (1993) (U.S. military inter-
vention in Panama). 
 168. For U.K. decisions, see, e.g., Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 305, 308–10; Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 
102–04; Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 101–02, 
¶¶85–89. For U.S. decisions, see, e.g., Regarding the Situation of the Detainees 
at Guantanamo Bay, United States MC 259-02, Resolution 2/11, Inter-Am. 
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In such circumstances, the test is clear and its application 
straightforward: the fact of effective control over a territory (re-
gardless of its legality) engages the occupying State’s responsi-
bilities under human rights treaties to which it is a Party.169 
Where the occupying State exercises effective control over a ter-
ritory, it is generally required to ensure the entire range of the 
inhabitants’ substantive rights and is liable for any violations of 
those rights.170  
A common rationale for extending human rights protections 
to persons in the occupied territory is to avoid the emergence of 
a protection “vacuum” if the inhabitants were deprived of the 
safeguards they enjoyed prior to occupation.171 Effectively, the 
occupying State steps in the shoes of the occupied State. How-
ever, the occupying State has been held to its human rights ob-
ligations even where the occupied State was not party to the 
same treaties and where no such “vacuum” could logically 
arise.172 In such cases, human rights obligations have followed 
the occupier’s flag.  
The most frequently cited interpretation of the effective con-
trol test is the European Court’s Banković decision—which also 
happens to be the most stringent application of the test.173 
There, a unanimous Grand Chamber infamously held that the 
 
Comm’n H.R. (July 22, 2011) (urging the United States to determine the legal 
status of detainees); see also Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, 
299–302, ¶¶ 140–153 (finding Dutch effective control over a checkpoint in Iraq). 
 169. See Al-Skeini, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 169, ¶ 138.  
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 170, ¶ 142. 
 172. The ECtHR has applied the European Convention outside Europe’s 
espace juridique (legal space) in, inter alia, Iraq (Jaloud, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
229; Al-Jedda, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305; Al-Skeini, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99; 
Al-Saadoon, 2010-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 61; Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Mar. 30, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67460); Kenya 
(Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131); Sudan (Ramirez Sánchez v. 
France, App. No. 28780/95, 86 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155 (1996)); Iran 
(Pad v. Turkey, App. No. 60167/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 28, 2007), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-81672); a U.N. neutral buffer-zone (Isaak v. Tur-
key, App. No. 44587/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 28, 2006), http://hudoc.echr 
.coe.int/eng?i=001-77533); and international waters (Medvedyev v. France, 
2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61). See Al-Skeini, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 170, ¶ 142. 
But see Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 359, ¶ 80 (“[T]he de-
sirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human rights’ protection has so far 
been relied on by the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction only when the 
territory in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would nor-
mally be covered by the Convention.”) (emphasis added). 
 173. Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
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European Convention did not apply to NATO’s aerial bombing of 
television and radio facilities in Belgrade, which killed a number 
of civilians.174 The Court found no “jurisdictional link” between 
the victims of the air-strikes and the NATO States,175 noting 
that “the real connection” was the bombing itself—i.e., “the im-
pugned act which, wherever decided, was performed, or had ef-
fects, outside of the territory of those States (‘the extra-territo-
rial act’).”176 The Court concluded that this extraterritorial act, 
without more, could not bring the applicants and their deceased 
relatives within the jurisdiction of the respondent States.177 
The Banković decision has been much criticized,178 including 
by ECtHR judges,179 and the Court has departed from it in its 
more recent decisions.180 But, even if not good law, Banković is 
still law.181 Most relevant for present purposes is the Court’s 
view that a single extraterritorial act (here, the bombing) cannot 
trigger the respondent States’ positive obligation under Article 1 
to secure the Convention rights in the affected territory.182 The 
Court described the applicants’ “‘cause-and-effect’ notion of ju-
risdiction” as  
tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imput-
able to a Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may have 
been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought within the 
jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1 of the Conven-
tion.183 
 
 174. Id. at 359. 
 175. Id.; cf. Ben El Mahi v. Denmark, 2006-XV Eur. Ct. H.R. 365; Marković 
v. Italy, 2006-XIV Eur. Ct. H.R. 235, 260, ¶ 50. 
 176. Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 350, ¶ 54. 
 177. Id. at 350, ¶ 54, 359, ¶ 82. 
 178. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human 
Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 529, 538–51 (2003); Erik Roxstrom et al., The NATO 
Bombing Case (Banković et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits of Western Hu-
man Rights Protection, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55 (2005); see also Maria L. Banda, 
On the Water’s Edge? A Comparative Study of the Influence of International Law 
and the Extraterritorial Reach of Domestic Laws in the War on Terror Jurispru-
dence, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 525, 546 (2010). 
 179. See, e.g., Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 329 (Loucadies, 
J., dissenting in part). 
 180. See infra Part III.C. 
 181. See infra note 231. 
 182. Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 356–57, ¶¶ 74–75. 
 183. Id. at 356–57, ¶ 75. 
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The Court rejected this theory on the grounds that the positive 
obligation to secure the rights and freedoms under the Conven-
tion cannot “be divided and tailored” based on the particular cir-
cumstances of the extraterritorial act in question, as that would 
render the Convention’s jurisdictional clause superfluous.184  
How suitable is the effective control test for dealing with 
transboundary environmental harm? The doctrine is restrictive. 
Given that it owes its existence to a particular scenario (military 
occupation), it is difficult to apply in other cases. It is particu-
larly unworkable in situations involving transboundary environ-
mental harm. As former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
and the Environment John Knox noted, “[i]f dropping bombs on 
a city does not amount to effective control of its occupants, allow-
ing pollution to move across an international border almost cer-
tainly would not.”185 While this is certainly true under Banković, 
other approaches could open the door to transboundary environ-
mental claims.186  
B. THE PHYSICAL CONTROL TEST  
The second approach—the physical control test—has 
emerged from cases in which State agents mistreated persons on 
foreign soil without seizing control of the other State’s territory 
or public authorities, for example, through arrest, kidnapping, 
detention, or rendition,187 actions of their diplomatic or consular 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Knox, supra note 23, at 87. 
 186. See infra Part III.C; see also Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 99, 168, ¶ 137 (“[W]henever the State, through its agents, exercises 
control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is un-
der an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and 
freedoms . . . that are relevant to the situation of that individual. In this sense, 
therefore, the Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored’ (compare 
Banković . . . § 75).”). 
 187. For Inter-American cases, see, e.g., Coard v. United States, Case 
10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 
rev. ¶ 37 (1999) (applying the physical control test where U.S. armed forces in 
Granada detained and subjected applicants to an unfair trial); Aisalla Molina 
(Ecuador v. Colombia), Inter-State Petition IP-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Re-
port No. 112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140, doc. 10 ¶ 91 (2010) (applying the test to 
the extrajudicial execution of an Ecuadorian citizen by agents of Colombia’s mil-
itary forces during an eleven-hour operation on Ecuadorian soil). See also Per-
sons Detained by the United States in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Precautionary Measure No. 259/02 (Mar. 12, 2002), http://www 
.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/decisions/GuatanamoMC.asp#MC25902.  
For European cases, see, e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 
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staff,188 and interception on the high seas.189 
As the European Court noted in relation to these cases, ju-
risdiction does not arise “solely from the control exercised by the 
Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which 
the individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the 
exercise of physical power and control over the person in ques-
tion.”190 The physical control test is thus a variant of the first 
 
6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 1, 21, ¶¶ 8, 10 (1976) (“[I]nsofar as 
[Turkish] armed forces, by their acts or omissions, affect [Cypriot] persons’ 
rights or freedoms under the Convention, the responsibility of Turkey is en-
gaged.”); Freda v. Italy, App. No. 8916/80, 21 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
250, 255, ¶ 3 (1980) (arrest by Costa Rican police, on behalf of Italian police, and 
forced transport to Italy); Reinette v. France, App. No. 14009/88, 63 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 189, 193 (1989) (arrest and detention on board a mil-
itary aircraft by French authorities); Ramirez Sánchez v. France, App. No. 
28780/95, 86 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155, 161–62, ¶ 2 (1996) (arrest in 
Sudan and forced transport by French police to France); Issa v. Turkey, App. 
No. 31821/96, ¶¶ 71–76 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 30, 2004) (arrest and execution by 
Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq); Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 
131, 164–65, ¶ 91 (arrest by Turkish security forces in Nairobi Airport’s inter-
national area). 
It is not always clear which test the ECtHR meant to apply. In some cases, 
it may have been applying the first test. See, e.g., Al-Saadoon v. United King-
dom, 2010-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 101–02, ¶¶ 86–89 (Iraqi nationals detained in 
British-controlled military prisons in Iraq fell within UK’s jurisdiction since it 
exercised total and exclusive control over the prisons and the individuals detained 
in them). In other cases, the Court may have been motivated by the third test. 
See, e.g., Xhavara v. Italy, App. No. 39473/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 1, 2001), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-5809 (ramming of an Albanian ship carry-
ing illegal migrants by an Italian military vessel brought claimants within It-
aly’s jurisdiction); X. v. Switzerland, App. Nos. 7289/75, 7349/76, 9 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 64–65 (1977) (prohibition imposed by Swiss police on a Ger-
man citizen’s entry into Liechtenstein pursuant to Swiss-Liechtenstein treaty). 
For UNHRC cases, see López Burgos v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. R.12/52 
(June 6, 1979), at 176, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) (1981); Celiberti de 
Casariego v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. 56/1979 (July 29, 1981), at 92, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985). See also Munaf v. Romania, Commc’n No. 1539/2006 (July 
30, 2009), at 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 (2009) (transfer of Iraqi-
American from Romanian embassy in Baghdad to multinational forces in Iraq). 
 188. See, e.g., Montero v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. 106/1981 (Mar. 31, 1983), 
at 136, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) (refusal by Uruguayan consulate in Ger-
many to renew passport of a Uruguayan national). Note that the consular cases, 
which have generally dealt with denial of passports or visas to nationals resid-
ing abroad, do not involve true exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction since au-
thority rests with the State of nationality.  
 189. See, e.g., Medvedyev v. France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 87, ¶ 67 (in-
terception of Cambodian-registered ship and detention of crew); Haitian Ctr. for 
Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 171 (1997) (interception of refugees). 
 190. Al-Skeini, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 168, ¶ 136 (emphasis added). 
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test. However, it lowers the threshold relative to the effective 
control test by requiring evidence of the State’s exercise of con-
trol or authority over a particular individual or group, and not 
the geographic area where the alleged violation took place.191 
The test was most famously formulated in the UNHRC’s 
early case of López Burgos v. Uruguay, in which Uruguayan se-
curity and intelligence forces had kidnapped and detained a 
Uruguayan political refugee in Argentina before clandestinely 
transporting him back to Uruguay, where he was tortured.192 
The UNHRC explained that the obligation to respect and ensure 
rights “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction” under Article 2(1) of the ICCPR “does not imply that 
the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for viola-
tions of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon 
the territory of another State . . . .”193 Similarly, it found that the 
reference to “individuals subject to its jurisdiction” in the Op-
tional Protocol refers “not to the place where the violation oc-
curred, but rather to the relationship between the individual and 
the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in 
the Covenant, wherever they occurred.”194 Since that relation-
ship arose as a result of the State’s violation of the claimant’s 
rights, it effectively amounts to the cause-and-effect theory of ju-
risdiction that Banković rejected.  
The rationale for extending human rights protections to in-
dividuals in these circumstances is fundamental justice:  
[I]t would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility un-
der . . . the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations 
of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it 
could not perpetrate on its own territory.195  
 
 191. See, e.g., Coard, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
109/99, ¶ 37 (“[T]he inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality or 
presence within a particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific 
circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its authority 
and control.”). Note that the European Commission and the IACHR have his-
torically applied the physical control test even where the effective control test 
might have been met. See, e.g., id.; Cyprus, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 
8, ¶¶ 8, 10. More recently, however, the IACHR may have edged closer to the 
effective control test. See, e.g., Ameziane v. United States, Petition P-900-08, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R., Report No. 17/12, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.144, doc. 21 ¶¶ 30–
32 (2012) (detention of an Algerian national by U.S. agents in Afghanistan). 
 192. López Burgos, Commc’n No. R.12/52, at 176–77. 
 193. Id. at 182, ¶ 12.3. 
 194. Id. at 182, ¶ 12.2 (emphasis added). 
 195. Id. at 183 (emphasis added); cf. Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, 
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A number of other judgments have since echoed this logic.196 The 
Inter-American institutions, in particular, have emphasized the 
principles of equality and nondiscrimination in determining 
whether a State could be held accountable extraterritorially.197  
The content of the State’s duties under the physical control 
test, however, is generally narrower than under the effective 
control test. In cases involving limited activities of State agents 
abroad, courts have not asked the State to protect the full range 
of substantive rights. Rather, the obligation is limited to respect 
for the rights of persons whose lives are being interfered with, 
for the period of interference.198 
At the same time, the physical control test extends the geo-
graphic scope of State obligations relative to the effective control 
test. However, like the effective control test, this test is of little 
avail to victims of transboundary environmental harm—except 
in the unlikely scenario where State agents physically transport 
harmful pollutants across the border. But it would not reach the 
typical case where pollution travels across the border via pollut-
ing media like air or water.199  
 
Commc’n No. 56/1979 (July 29, 1981), at 94, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985). 
 196. See, e.g., Ben El Mahi v. Denmark, 2006-XV Eur. Ct. H.R. 367, 376 (“Ac-
countability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 cannot be in-
terpreted so as to allow a State Party to perpetrate violations of the Convention 
on the territory of another State which it would not be permitted to perpetrate 
on its own territory.”); Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, at 24, ¶ 71 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Nov. 16, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67460; cf. Isaak v. Tur-
key, App. No. 44587/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-87146 (noting that Article 2 requires States to protect the lives of 
those in their jurisdiction). 
 197. See, e.g., Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 37 (1999). 
 198. See Aisalla Molina (Ecuador v. Colombia), Inter-State Petition IP-02, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140, doc. 10 ¶ 100 
(2010) (rather than “guarantee[ing] the catalogue of substantive rights estab-
lished in the American Convention . . . the obligation . . . arise[s] in the period 
of time that agents of a State interfere in the lives of persons who are on the 
territory of the other State, for those agents to respect their rights, in particular, 
their right to life and humane treatment.”); cf. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 
2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 168, ¶ 137 (“[T]he State is under an obligation . . . to 
secure to that individual the rights and freedoms . . . that are relevant to the 
situation of that individual.”) (emphasis added). 
 199. Drawing an analogy to this line of cases, Boyle has argued that the 
ECHR could apply extraterritorially where a State fails to prevent environmen-
tal harm in neighboring countries. Boyle, supra note 87, at 500 (“If states are 
responsible for their failure to control soldiers and judges abroad, a fortiori they 
should likewise be held responsible for a failure to control trans-boundary pol-
lution and environmental harm emanating from industrial activities inside 
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C. THE DIRECT EFFECTS TEST  
Most relevant for present purposes is what I call the direct 
effects test. This approach has been applied in a small number of 
cases involving incidental cross-border harm or extraterritorial 
impacts of domestic measures, often under a different label. This 
line of cases is distinct from the physical control test discussed 
above: here, the act of violation brought the individual within a 
State’s “jurisdiction” not because the State’s agents were acting 
on foreign soil but because the effects of their actions were felt 
there.200  
The notion that acts or omissions that produce adverse ef-
fects on human rights outside a State’s territory may give rise to 
international responsibility has long been acknowledged in In-
ter-American201 and European202 jurisprudence. However, the 
case law started reflecting this principle only recently—and of-
ten without expressly admitting the doctrinal shift.203 In several 
 
their own territory. These activities are within their jurisdiction in the obvious 
sense of being subject to their own law and administrative controls. Only the 
effects are extraterritorial.”). The difficulty with this analysis is that most hu-
man rights conventions require that the claimants (not the activities) be within 
the State’s “jurisdiction.” More importantly, as explained above, the physical 
control test (based on actions of State agents abroad) does not support extrater-
ritorial application in environmental cases. However, the direct effects test, 
which I discuss in Part III.C below, does. 
 200. This test should not be confused with the effects test in the domestic 
context, which is used to extend U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign ac-
tivities whose effects are felt domestically. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS § 402 cmt.d (AM. LAW INST. 1986). 
 201. See, e.g., Saldaño v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
38/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 17 (1999) (explaining that the term “ju-
risdiction” under Article 1(1) “is not limited to or merely coextensive with na-
tional territory. . . . [A] state party to the American Convention may be respon-
sible under certain circumstances for the acts and omissions of its agents which 
produce effects or are undertaken outside that state’s own territory”) (emphasis 
added). 
 202. See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Mar. 23, 1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?=001-57920 (“[T]he responsibility 
of Contracting Parties can be involved because of acts of their authorities, 
whether performed within or outside national boundaries, which produce effects 
outside their own territory.”) (emphasis added); cf. Drozd v. France, App. No. 
12747/87, ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?= 
001-57774 (“[State] responsibility can be involved because of acts of their au-
thorities producing effects outside their own territory.”). 
 203. See Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Re-
port No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, ¶ 37 (1999); infra note 205. 
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cases that turn on the extraterritorial effects of the State’s ac-
tions, tribunals have actually employed the language of the 
physical control test.  
First, human rights obligations have been held to apply 
where State agents caused harm to persons outside of the State’s 
territory. For example, in Alejandre v. Cuba, the Inter-American 
Commission found that the shooting down of two civilian aircraft 
by a Cuban jet fighter in international airspace brought the vic-
tims within Cuba’s authority and triggered Cuba’s duties under 
the American Declaration.204 No further jurisdictional link or 
special connection between Cuba and the aircraft passengers 
was required. While the Commission used the language of the 
physical control test,205 in reality it was applying the direct ef-
fects test.206  
Similarly, in Bastidas Meneses v. Ecuador, the Commission 
found that the American Convention applied where four Colom-
bian nationals were killed by gunshots fired across the border by 
Ecuador’s armed forces.207 The Commission stated that it would 
consider “evidence regarding the participation of the agents of 
the Ecuadorian State in the incidents, regardless of whether the 
incidents took place outside its territory,” because the petition 
claimed violations of the American Convention by State 
agents.208 The Commission also emphasized that the Convention 
can apply to “the conduct with an extraterritorial locus, where 
the person is not present in a State’s territory,” so long as “there 
is a causal connection between the extraterritorial conduct of a 
State and the alleged violation of the rights and liberties of a 
person.”209 This is essentially the cause-and-effect theory of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction rejected by Banković.  
The European Court itself has followed a similar approach 
after Banković. In Andreou v. Turkey, a Cypriot national was 
 
 204. Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
86/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶¶ 23–25 (1999). 
 205. Id. ¶ 25 (“[A]gents of the Cuban State, although outside their territory, 
placed the civilian pilots of the ‘Brothers to the Rescue’ organization under their 
authority.”). 
 206. Id. (“[T]he victims died as a consequence of direct actions taken by 
agents of the Cuban State in international airspace.”). 
 207. See Bastidas Meneses v. Ecuador, Petition 189-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 153/11, ¶ 18 (2011). 
 208. Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added). 
 209. Id. ¶ 22 (emphasis added). 
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shot by Turkish forces on territory beyond Turkey’s control.210 
The Court found that the shooting was “the direct and immedi-
ate cause” of injury.211 This was sufficient to bring the victims 
within Turkey’s jurisdiction. As the Court explained, 
“acts . . . which produce effects outside [a State’s] territory and 
over which they exercise no control or authority may amount to 
the exercise by them of jurisdiction” under the Convention.212 
The Court applied the same reasoning in Pad v. Turkey, where 
a group of Iranian nationals was shot from Turkish helicopters 
near the Turkey-Iran border.213 The Court did not establish on 
which side of the border the murder took place: what was deci-
sive was that the cause of the injury was the discharge of weap-
ons by Turkey’s troops, regardless of where they, or the victims, 
happened to be.  
Second, human rights obligations have followed the State’s 
extraterritorial exercise of legislative authority. For example, in 
Kovačić v. Slovenia, the European Court found that Slovenia’s 
legislation, which had deprived Croatian residents of their sav-
ings in a Slovenian bank in Croatia, was “produc[ing] effects, al-
beit outside Slovenian territory,” such that it engaged Slovenia’s 
responsibility under the Convention.214 Similarly, in Gueye v. 
France, the UNHRC established that the Covenant applied to 
discrimination claims by retired Senegalese soldiers of the 
French Army residing in Senegal.215 The UNHRC observed that 
the claimants were “not generally subject to French ‘jurisdiction,’ 
except that they rely on French legislation in relation to the 
amount of their pension rights,” and concluded that they could 
bring a claim against France on that basis.216 
Third, human rights obligations have attached to the State’s 
exercise of adjudicative or enforcement measures affecting per-
sons outside of its territory. For example, in Stephens v. Malta, 
a British national was arrested and detained in Spain at Malta’s 
 
 210. Andreou v. Turkey, App. No. 45653/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 3, 2008), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-88068 (admissibility decision). 
 211. Id. at 11. 
 212. Id. at 10–11. 
 213. Pad v. Turkey, App. No. 60167/00 ¶¶ 54–55 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 28, 
2007). 
 214. Kovačić v. Slovenia, App. Nos. 44574/98, 45133/98, 48316/99 § 5(c) (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Apr. 1, 2004) (admissibility decision). 
 215. Gueye v. Grance, Commc’n No. 196/1985, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985 (1989). 
 216. Id. at 193–94, ¶ 9.4. 
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extradition request, issued pursuant to a Maltese arrest warrant 
alleging that he had conspired in Spain to transport drugs to 
Malta.217 The applicant was under Spain’s control and authority 
throughout the relevant period.218 However, focusing on the 
cause of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty, the Court found 
“its sole origin” in Malta’s measures.219 In effect, because Malta’s 
actions “set[] in motion” and “instigated” the applicant’s deten-
tion, the responsibility for any violation of the Convention lay 
with Malta even though the arrest and detention were executed 
entirely in Spain.220 
Finally, the scope of extraterritorial duties may depend on 
the State’s power to protect rights in a given case. As the Euro-
pean Court observed,  
even in the absence of effective control of a territory outside its borders, 
the State still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Conven-
tion to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it 
is in its power to take . . . to secure . . . the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention.221 
This is the broadest articulation of the direct effects test, which 
zeroes in on the State’s power or capacity to protect rights in a 
given case (positive duties) rather than its actual measures (neg-
ative duties). In his Partial Dissent in Ilaşcu, Judge Loucaides 
reasoned that a State should “be accountable . . . for failure to 
discharge its positive obligations in respect of any person if it 
was in a position to exercise its authority directly or even indi-
rectly over that person or over the territory where that person 
is.”222 This notion of positive duties speaks to the concept of due 
diligence in environmental law, which I discuss below. 
Building on the above case law, the Inter-American Court 
had an opportunity to refine and clarify the direct effects test in 
its Advisory Opinion. However, it took a different approach. 
 
 217. Stephens v. Malta (No. 1), App. No. 11956/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 21, 
2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92351. 
 218. Id. ¶ 51. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. ¶ 52. 
 221. Manoilescu v. Romania, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 357, 390, ¶ 101. The case 
involved the transfer of private property by Romania to Russia; Russia’s obliga-
tion under Article 1 was not engaged because of its sovereign immunity. Id. at 
392, ¶ 107; see also Treska v. Albania, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 410; Armed 
Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 
I.C.J. 168, ¶ 178 (Dec. 19).  
 222. See Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 329 (Loucaides, J., 
dissenting in part). 
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First, consistent with the two traditional tests discussed above, 
the Court opined that the term “jurisdiction” in Article 1(1) of 
the American Convention encompasses any situation in which a 
State exercises “authority” over a person or subjects the person 
to its “effective control,” whether within or outside its terri-
tory.223 Second, seemingly in line with the direct effects test, the 
Court explained that the term “jurisdiction” can also embrace 
activities within a State that cause cross-border effects, as States 
have a duty to prevent transboundary environmental damage 
that could impair the rights of persons outside their territory.224 
Therefore, it advised that, in cases of transboundary environ-
mental harm, a person will be deemed to be subject to the “juris-
diction” of the State in which the harm originates if there is a 
“causal relationship” between the polluting activities in the 
State’s territory and the cross-border impact on rights.225 How-
ever, the Court explained that the exercise of jurisdiction arises 
because the State has “effective control” over the activities that 
caused the damage and is in a position to prevent harm.226  
In other words, rather than treating the direct effects as a 
separate basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court chose to 
subsume this approach under the effective control test. The 
Court thus essentially redefined the effective control test in the 
Advisory Opinion: in the Inter-American context, effective con-
trol now apparently also refers to the State’s control over the do-
mestic activities in question (as understood in international en-
vironmental law) and not merely its control over a person or 
territory (as usually understood in international human rights 
law).  
D. SUMMARY 
As the foregoing discussion shows, the dominant under-
standing of the extraterritorial scope of human rights treaties 
(as reflected in the first and second tests) will almost certainly 
fail to capture cases in which a State causes, or permits, cross-
border pollution that harms another State’s inhabitants. This is 
a major barrier to justice for victims whose own State chooses 
 
 223. Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 19, ¶ 81.  
 224. Id. ¶¶ 81, 95, 101. 
 225. Id. ¶ 101. 
 226. Id. ¶ 102. 
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not to use inter-State dispute procedures in environmental mat-
ters.227 Given this jurisprudence, it is not surprising that schol-
ars generally discount the potential contribution of the human 
rights regime to redressing cross-border pollution.228 
Yet, as this Article shows, that is an overly pessimistic view, 
as it ignores the emergence and the human rights tribunals’ si-
lent application of a third test.229 The direct effects test, if 
adopted more widely, could ensure that the victims are not de-
nied their right to a remedy if their home State chooses not to or 
cannot espouse their claims.230 As this Article has shown, inter-
national responsibility can and does attach to State actions that 
have caused direct harm to persons outside the State’s own ter-
ritory—even in the absence of effective control over a foreign ter-
ritory or direct control over a person.231 The decisive element is 
the presence of a direct causal link between the State’s actions 
within its own jurisdiction and the injury suffered abroad.  
There is no reason why the same approach should not apply 
to cross-border pollution—if the act originates in the State’s ter-
ritory but causes harm abroad. In this sense, the direct effects 
test could serve as the channel through which the environmental 
regime can inform and complement the human rights regime at 
their points of intersection.  
 
 227. See supra Introduction. 
 228. For example, Knox has argued that the IEL regime might hold compa-
rably more promise for individual claims, as would the ICESCR (especially its 
duty to cooperate). See Knox, supra note 23, at 82, 86–88, 93 (noting that human 
rights law has “unclear” extraterritorial scope and provides “few precedents” 
applicable to transboundary environmental harm); see also John H. Knox, Cli-
mate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 200–04 (2009) 
(“Arguing that the extraterritorial harm caused by climate change meets the 
‘effective control’ test would be difficult, but . . . ICESCR . . . provides a clearer 
basis for extraterritorial duties . . . .”). 
 229. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 23, at 87 (emphasizing the “effective control” 
test). 
 230. See supra Introduction. 
 231. This reasoning stands in direct opposition to Banković’s admonition 
against the “cause-and-effect” theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See supra 
text accompanying notes 183–84. Despite these recent decisions, the ECtHR 
continues reiterating support for this aspect of Banković. See Medvedyev v. 
France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 92, ¶ 64 (affirming that “an instantaneous 
extraterritorial act” falls outside the purview of the Convention, which does “not 
admit of a ‘cause and effect’ notion of ‘jurisdiction’”). 
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E. IS THE DIRECT EFFECTS TEST LIMITLESS? 
But just how far should the direct effects test—and the scope 
of State responsibility under human rights treaties—extend? In 
today’s globalized world, virtually every domestic decision—from 
tax policy to labor law—can send ripples through other States. 
As Henry Shue noted, in a dense web of economic relations, “a 
vote in Washington to change the wheat price supports for Ne-
braska can change the price of bread in Calcutta and the price of 
meat in Kiev.”232 Adverse impacts on other States’ citizens will 
vary in magnitude and frequency.  
For example, if State A imposes high import-tariffs on 
wheat, it could contribute to unemployment and poverty in State 
B’s wheat-exporting regions. But does State A have a duty under 
human rights law not to impose such measures? Or, if State C 
adopts a liberal immigration policy favoring doctors from devel-
oping countries such as State D, it could deprive State D of its 
medical talent. But would State C be liable under human rights 
law if a person in State D dies due to a lack of medical staff? Or, 
if State E bans the use of a carcinogenic pesticide produced in 
State F, it could reduce demand for State F’s exports. But would 
State E incur responsibility if the resulting unemployment 
causes hardship to State F’s workers?  
Holding States liable under such circumstances risks 
stretching the direct effects test too far. Not every domestic act 
(or omission) that produces effects outside a State’s territory 
should give rise to international responsibility under human 
rights law. Many cross-border impacts are better addressed in 
political forums, under MEAs, or in trade negotiations—not by 
human rights courts. As the European Court cautioned in 
Banković, a State cannot be liable to everyone adversely affected 
by an act imputable to the State, wherever in the world its con-
sequences are felt.233 
So where should we draw the line? For the direct effects test 
to be fair and workable,234 I suggest that the chain of causation 
 
 232. Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 687, 694 (1988). 
 233. Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 356, ¶ 75. 
 234. Milanovic, in contrast, argues that the physical control test (which he 
calls the “personal model”) goes too far by imposing duties on States towards all 
individuals whose rights they are able to violate and that it cannot be usefully 
limited. MILANOVIC, supra note 22, at 119, 171–73, 186–87, 206–07. Milanovic, 
however, appears to treat all cases not applying the effective control test (which 
he calls the “spatial model”) as falling within the personal model. Id. at 184–85, 
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must be sufficiently clear and attributable to the State by virtue 
of its (or its agents’) acts or omissions. Human rights treaties do 
not always provide clear guidance in this respect. However, as I 
explain below, in situations involving human rights injuries re-
sulting from transboundary environment harm, international 
environmental law can supply reasonable limits on State liabil-
ity that could also be applied under the direct effects test in the 
human rights context.235 I turn to that next.  
IV.  THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL 
HARM   
While the human rights regime has struggled to define its 
outer limits and often resorted to ad hoc approaches to establish 
the scope of States’ extraterritorial obligations, the duty to pre-
vent transboundary harm undergirds the entire international 
environmental regime.236 This Part briefly reviews the nature of 
this fundamental norm to explain how it might inform the scope 
of transboundary duties under human rights conventions. It dis-
tinguishes between two related customary duties—the duty to 
prevent, reduce, and control transboundary environmental harm 
(Part IV.A), and the duty to cooperate with the potentially af-
fected States in mitigating risks of transboundary environmen-
tal harm (Part IV.B)—which are firmly established in the juris-
prudence and reflected in a large number of treaties. It also 
considers the common core of sovereignty-related obligations 
(Part IV.C). 
A. THE DUTY TO PREVENT 
It is a tenet of general international law that States may not 
conduct or allow activities in their territory, or in common 
spaces, in disregard of the rights of other States, such as allow-
ing hostile expeditions into their neighbors’ territory.237 This is 
 
202, 204. As this Article has shown, there is a substantial difference between 
the physical control test, which involves activities of State agents on foreign soil, 
and the direct effects test, which involves extraterritorial consequences of do-
mestic activities. The former does not risk collapsing onto itself; it is rather the 
latter that is in need of limiting principles, which, as explained in Part IV below, 
can be derived from IEL in the nexus cases. 
 235. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 236. See supra Part I.B. 
 237. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) 
(emphasizing “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States” among “certain general and 
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the maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: use what is 
yours so as not to injure others.238 States are responsible for ac-
tivities, occurring in their territory, which have injurious extra-
territorial effects.239  
This principle was extended to the environmental realm in 
the seminal Trail Smelter arbitration between the United States 
and Canada—the first inter-State dispute over air pollution.240 
Throughout the 1920s, a large smelter in Trail, British Colum-
bia, was releasing great quantities of sulfur dioxide (SO2) into 
the air.241 By 1930, it was emitting 300–350 tons of SO2 fumes 
daily. The fumes travelled from Canada down the Columbia 
River Valley into the State of Washington, where they were 
harming local farms and forests. In 1934, the damage was so 
considerable that President Franklin D. Roosevelt raised the is-
sue directly with the Canadian Prime Minister on behalf of U.S. 
nationals. The United States, where it was already established 
that one U.S. state may not cause cross-border harm to an-
other,242 eventually commenced arbitration against Canada.  
In the final award, the Tribunal famously ruled that, 
under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the 
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the ter-
ritory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is 
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and con-
vincing evidence.243 
 
well-recognized principles” of international law); see also ILC 1949 Survey, su-
pra note 57, at 34, ¶ 57. 
 238. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 346–47 (8th ed. 1955) 
(“[This maxim] is applicable to relations of States no less than to those of indi-
viduals.”). 
 239. The precise nature of the duty requires further elaboration. See gener-
ally Boyle, supra note 16. 
 240. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1938 (1941). 
 241. Id. at 1945. 
 242. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238–39 (1907); Mis-
souri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521–22 (1906). 
 243. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965. The Tribunal relied, inter alia, on Al-
abama Claims (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 129–32 (1872) (establishing 
the due diligence principle in the context of neutrality) and CLYDE EAGLETON, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1928) (“A state 
owes at all times a duty to protect other states against injurious acts by individ-
uals from within its jurisdiction.”). It also cited U.S. and Swiss federal case law 
on internal disputes over pollution. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1963. 
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In other words, Canada’s “presumptive freedom of ac-
tion . . . within its territory” had to yield to “higher legal consid-
erations.”244  
The Tribunal held Canada responsible under international 
law for the smelter’s conduct.245 Canada was not only liable for 
past injuries suffered by the United States, but also had to en-
sure that the smelter would “refrain from causing any damage 
through fumes” to its neighbor in the future.246 To control and 
reduce emissions to a point where they would not “cause injury 
to plant life” across the boundary, the Tribunal put in place “a 
regime” to collect scientific data.247 
The Trail Smelter principle has been reaffirmed in numer-
ous international decisions,248 General Assembly resolutions,249 
work of the ILC,250 international standards and guidelines,251 
 
 244. See ILC 1949 Survey, supra note 57, ¶ 109. 
 245. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1966 (Canada has “the duty . . . to see to it 
that this conduct should be in conformity with the obligation of the Dominion 
under international law . . . .”). 
 246. Id. at 1966. 
 247. Id. at 1966, 1974. 
 248. See, e.g., Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Ry. (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, 
¶ 59 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005) (“[W]here development may cause significant harm 
to the environment there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such 
harm . . . . This duty . . . has now become a principle of general international 
law. This principle applies not only in autonomous activities but also in activi-
ties undertaken in implementation of specific treaties between the Parties.”); 
id. ¶¶ 222–223; see also Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8); Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration 
(Pak. v. India), Partial Award, ¶ 448 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), https://pcacases.com/ 
web/sendAttach/1681. 
 249. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 60, princ. 21; Rio Declaration, 
supra note 84, princ. 2; G.A. Res. 2995 (XXVII), Co-operation Between States in 
the Field of the Environment, ¶ 1 (Dec. 15, 1972); G.A. Res. 3129 (XXVIII), Co-
operation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural Resources 
Shared by Two or More States (Dec. 13, 1973); G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, arts. 3, 30 (Dec. 12, 1974); G.A. Res. 
34/186, Co-operation in the Field of Environment Concerning Natural Re-
sources Shared by Two or More States, art. 2 (Dec. 18, 1979); World Charter for 
Nature, supra note 84, ¶ 14; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS § 601 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 250. See Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 29, at 148, ¶ 3; see also Int’l 
Law Comm’n, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Trans-
boundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, in Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter Draft Principles on 
Liability].  
 251. See, e.g., Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment 
for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of 
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, U.N. Env’t Progr. Governing 
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and has become firmly entrenched in the corpus of customary 
international law.252  
As the ICJ ruled in Pulp Mills, a dispute between Argentina 
and Uruguay over Uruguay’s decision to build a pulp-processing 
plant on the River Uruguay,  
the principle of prevention, as a customary rule, has its origins in the 
due diligence that is required of a State in its territory. It is “every 
State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States.” A State is thus obliged to use all 
the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place 
in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant 
damage to the environment of another State.253  
Nowadays, the vast majority of transboundary environmen-
tal matters are governed by more specific (treaty-based) rules 
that have developed since 1972 to address particular issues,254 
such as marine pollution. However, customary law obligations 
have influenced the design of the modern MEAs: the principle of 
prevention of transboundary harm to the environment, persons, 
and property is now a cornerstone of numerous treaties, includ-
ing on nuclear accidents, space objects, international water-
courses, hazardous waste, and marine pollution.255 
 
Council Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.6.17, princ. 1–3 (May 19, 1978) 
[hereinafter UNEP Principles]; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Recommendations of the Council on Principles Concerning Trans-
frontier Pollution, OECD Doc. No. C(74)224 (Nov. 14, 1974). 
 252. See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opin-
ion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8) (“[T]he environment is not an abstraction but 
represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human 
beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation of 
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of 
the corpus of international law relating to the environment.”); see also 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 53, 140 (Sept. 
25); Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 19, ¶¶ 119, 
120, 127–174; Canada: Statement of Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics for Damage Caused by Cosmos 954, 18 I.L.M. 899 (1979) (seeking 
compensation following the disintegration of a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite 
over Canada). 
 253. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 101 (Apr. 
20) (quoting Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9)); 
cf. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica v. 
Nicar.) and Construction of Road in Costa Rica Along San Juan River (Nicar. v. 
Costa Rica), 2015 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 104 (Dec. 16). 
 254. See supra Part I.B. 
 255. See Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 29, at 149, ¶ 5; see, e.g., 
U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) arts. 3–4, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79; U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 192, Dec. 10, 1982, 
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Moreover, customary law remains relevant in other ways. In 
particular, it can aid courts’ interpretation of treaty-based duties 
relating to environmental protection. For example, in the South 
China Sea arbitration, ITLOS held that the corpus of interna-
tional environmental law informs the content of the general ob-
ligation in Article 192 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), which requires States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other States or areas beyond their national control.256 Specifi-
cally, the Tribunal ruled that “States have a positive ‘duty to 
prevent, or at least mitigate’ significant harm to the environ-
ment when pursuing large-scale construction activities.”257 
Thus, even in the unlikely event that there are no applicable 
MEAs in a dispute, courts can rely on these antecedent custom-
ary norms. 
B. THE DUTY TO COOPERATE  
The duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm 
also entails a concomitant duty to cooperate with the potentially 
affected States to avert or contain any such harm. The duty to 
cooperate too is a “fundamental principle” of general interna-
tional law.258  
In the Lac Lanoux arbitration, a dispute between Spain and 
France over French plans to divert waters from a lake in the 
Pyrenees, the tribunal affirmed that international law does not 
grant the objecting State the “right of assent” or “right of veto,” 
which would, “at the discretion of one State paralyse[]  the exer-
cise of the territorial jurisdiction of another.”259 Instead, it 
 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) (“States have the obligation 
to protect and preserve the marine environment.”); id. art. 194 (embedding the 
duty to prevent harm). 
 256. South China Sea (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award, 
¶¶ 941, 944, 959 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/ 
2086. 
 257. Id. ¶ 941 (internal citations omitted). 
 258. Mox Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, ¶ 82 (ITLOS 
2001), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/ 
published/C10-O-3_dec_01.pdf (“[T]he duty to cooperate is a fundamental prin-
ciple in the prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII of 
the [UNCLOS] and general international law.”); see also Environment and Hu-
man Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 19, ¶¶ 181–209. 
 259. Lac Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, ¶ 11 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1957) 
(noting this would mean that “the State which is normally competent has lost 
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obliges States “to seek, by preliminary negotiations, terms for an 
agreement, without subordinating the exercise of their compe-
tences to the conclusion of such an agreement.”260 By cooperat-
ing, as the World Court stated in Pulp Mills, “the States con-
cerned can jointly manage the risks of damage to the 
environment that might be created by the plans initiated by one 
or [the] other of them, so as to prevent the damage in ques-
tion.”261  
Nowadays, a number of international and regional treaties 
specify detailed procedural obligations relating to notification, 
consultation, and the conduct of EIAs in case of transboundary 
environmental risk262—duties of bon voisinage that courts have 
also imposed as a matter of general international law.263 The ob-
ligation of States to cooperate (through notification, consulta-
tion, and negotiation) also permeates the Rio Declaration,264 the 
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm,265 and 
 
its right to act alone as a result of the unconditional and arbitrary opposition of 
another State”). 
 260. Id. However, sanctions can be applied in case “of an unjustified break-
ing off of the discussions, abnormal delay, disregard of the agreed procedures, 
systematic refusals to take into consideration adverse proposals or interests, 
and, more generally, in cases of violation of the rules of good faith.” Id. 
 261. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 77 (Apr. 
20). 
 262. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Inter-
national Watercourses arts. 8–9, 12, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter 
Watercourses Convention] (entered into force Aug. 17, 2014); Espoo Convention, 
supra note 90, arts. 2–5. 
 263. See, e.g., South China Sea (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, 
Award, ¶ 985, n.1181 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016); Certain Activities Carried Out by 
Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and Construction of Road in 
Costa Rica Along San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), 2015 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 104 
(Dec. 16) (the State contemplating activities is required “to notify and consult 
in good faith with the potentially affected State,” “in conformity with its due 
diligence obligation,” where that is necessary to determine the appropriate 
measures to prevent or mitigate the risk of significant transboundary harm); 
see also Whaling in Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan; N.Z. intervening), Judgment, 
2014 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 83, 240 (Mar. 31); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 140–147 (Sept. 25); Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan), Case Nos. 3, 4, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, ¶ 78 (ITLOS 
1999) (observing that the parties need to do more to cooperate); Land Reclama-
tion by Singapore in and Around Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, 
2003 ITLOS Rep. 10, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, ¶ 92. 
 264. See Rio Declaration, supra note 84, princ. 7, 9, 12–14, 18, 19, 27; cf. 
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 60, princ. 24. 
 265. See Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 29, arts. 4, 9, cmt. at 150 
¶ 6; see also infra Part V.B.1. 
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other guidelines on the conservation and management of shared 
natural resources.266 The duty to undertake a transboundary 
EIA to protect the shared environment has been particularly in-
fluential in recent disputes,267 and its importance will grow.  
The concept of international cooperation and assistance is 
not limited to the environmental regime. It is also a feature of 
human rights treaties on economic, social, and cultural rights.268 
However, in the latter context, this concept is both general and 
contested.269 International environmental law can thus provide 
more concrete guidance on the content of the duty to engage in 
international cooperation in cases involving transboundary en-
vironmental harm. 
In considering these foundational obligations underpinning 
the IEL regime, it is worth recalling that these cases have had a 
human rights dimension all along. In Pulp Mills, for example, 
Argentina worried that the Uruguayan plant could have “serious 
consequences for water quality, aquatic life and human health, 
not least through the bioaccumulation of pollutants in the food 
chain or other forms of exposure to toxic chemical substances.”270 
 
 266. See, e.g., UNEP Principles, supra note 251, princ. 7. 
 267. In Pulp Mills, the World Court interpreted the treaty obligation to pro-
tect and preserve the aquatic environment in accordance with a practice, which 
in recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now 
be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an 
[EIA] where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a 
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a 
shared resource. Moreover, due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and preven-
tion which it implies, would not be considered to have been exercised, if a party 
planning works liable to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters 
did not undertake an [EIA] on the potential effects of such works. 
Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 204 (Apr. 20); see 
also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, 1997 I.C.J. ¶¶ 112, 140; Indus Waters Kishenganga 
Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Partial Award, PCA Case Repository, ¶ 450 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2013); Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons 
and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (Seabed Activities), Case No. 
17, Advisory Opinion, ¶¶ 145, 147–150 (ITLOS 2011); Land Reclamation by Sin-
gapore in and Around Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, 2003 IT-
LOS Rep. 10, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, ¶¶ 95, 101(1)(b); Mox Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), 
Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, ¶¶ 84, 89 (ITLOS 2001). 
 268. See supra Part III. 
 269. See GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 62–65; see generally PATRICK 
MACKLEM, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 20–21 (2015). 
 270. Memorial of Argentina, ¶¶ 0.18, 7.4, Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. 
v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. Pleadings 14 (Apr. 20), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case 
-related/135/15425.pdf.  
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And in Trail Smelter itself, Washington State residents com-
plained of health impacts. A strong regime nexus thus exists in 
fact even when not expressly addressed in the law.  
C. REGIME NEXUS: A COMMON CORE 
Ultimately, the duty to prevent transboundary environmen-
tal (and economic) harm articulated in the Trail Smelter 
award—as well as the general duty of States not to allow their 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
States—is grounded in the exclusive jurisdiction of States over 
their territory.271 States are the beneficiaries of the norm of ter-
ritorial sovereignty, which entitles them to freedom of action and 
non-intervention in their domestic affairs, as described above.272 
But the flipside of sovereignty has always been obligation.273  
When the ILC first proposed codifying the duty to prevent 
after 1945, it saw it as one of the “obligations of territorial juris-
diction,” which it related to the law of nuisance.274 This category 
also included “the duties of States with regard to the use of the 
flow of international and non-national rivers in such matters as 
the pollution of and interference with the flow of rivers,” and co-
operation against the spread of epidemics.275 
It is striking that the ILC proposed dealing with trans-
boundary issues relating to the environment and actions of State 
agents on the territory of other States—a matter now frequently 
addressed by human rights tribunals—within the same branch 
of codified law.276 In this sense, the seemingly divergent princi-
ples of international law that nowadays govern the scope of State 
obligations under two different regimes (IEL and human rights) 
in reality share a common foundation: the duties arising from 
 
 271. See ILC 1949 Survey, supra note 57, at 34–35, ¶ 58. 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 147–51. 
 273. Sovereignty-related rights give rise to concomitant duties on States not 
to allow their territory to be used to harm other States. As Max Huber, the sole 
arbitrator in Island of Palmas, observed, territorial sovereignty “involves the 
exclusive right to display the activities of a State,” but this “right has as corol-
lary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other 
States . . . .” Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838–39 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1928); cf. S.S. Wimbledon (Gr. Brit. v. Ger.), Judgment, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17). 
 274. ILC 1949 Survey, supra note 57, at 34–35, ¶ 58. 
 275. Id. There was no mention yet of the environment as such; the emphasis 
was still on “considerable economic importance and urgency” of regulating this 
subject. See id. 
 276. See id. ¶¶ 59–60. 
  
1942 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1879 
 
the right to State sovereignty. Seen in this light, the requirement 
in human rights law that an individual must be within a State’s 
“jurisdiction” (before the duty to secure his or her human rights 
can attach) has to be read in the light of the State’s antecedent 
“obligations of territorial jurisdiction” not to cause harm to other 
States—and their inhabitants. 
V.  THE NATURE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AT THE 
REGIME NEXUS   
To ensure that communities have meaningful access to en-
vironmental justice, this Part argues that the nature of the (ver-
tical) obligation under human rights treaties in cases of trans-
boundary environmental harm should be read in the light of 
(horizontal) obligations States have under international envi-
ronmental law. As noted above, the extent to which principles of 
international environmental law can inform the application of 
human rights instruments is still an open question.277 This Arti-
cle seeks to move that analysis forward. This Part shows how 
principles from one congruent regime (IEL) could be imported 
into another (human rights law) to clarify the scope of State re-
sponsibility at their nexus and expand access to justice for af-
fected individuals and communities. After reviewing existing ju-
risprudence (Part V.A), it addresses several questions for 
implementation (Part V.B). 
A. REGIME INTERACTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
International legal regimes are rarely “self-contained.”278 
Disputes arising under one regime frequently require us to con-
sider its interaction with other regimes. Article 31(3)(c) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Con-
vention or VCLT) acknowledges this reality by requiring courts 
to take into account “[a]ny relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties” to a given dis-
pute.279  
 
 277. See supra note 26. 
 278. See supra Part I.A. 
 279. VCLT, supra note 79, art. 31(3)(c). A number of tribunals have relied 
on this provision. See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, 
Merits, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 161 (June 
27, 2012) (“[W]hen interpreting a treaty, it is necessary to take into account not 
only the agreements and instruments formally related to it (Article 31(2) of the 
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First, human rights courts do engage in systemic interpre-
tation envisaged under the Vienna Convention and frequently 
refer to external norms and standards280—albeit not always con-
sistently.281 As the Inter-American Commission observed in a 
case involving the extraterritorial application of the American 
Declaration, the Declaration “was not designed to apply in abso-
lute terms or in a vacuum.”282 The Declaration may be the pri-
mary source of international obligation and applicable law in the 
Inter-American system, but other sources of law can be relevant 
in effectuating the Commission’s mandate in specific circum-
stances.283  
Obviously, there is a risk that overzealous borrowing of prin-
ciples from one regime could eclipse or supplant principles from 
the other regime. As Philippe Sands and Jeffery Commission 
 
[VCLT]), but also the system of which it forms part (Article 31(3) of this instru-
ment).”); Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 350–51, ¶ 55 (“[T]he 
Convention must be interpreted in the light of the rules set out in the 1969 
Vienna Convention, [including art. 31(3)(c)].”); Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Ry. 
(Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, 66, ¶ 58 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005). 
 280. For example, the IACtHR has interpreted the Convention’s indigenous 
rights protections in light of other human rights treaties and International La-
bour Organization standards. See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 160, 204; Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi v. 
Panama, Case 12.354, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 125/12, ¶ 114 (2014); 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 117 (Mar. 29, 2006); see also 
“Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1 (Sept. 24, 1982) (interpreting the 1963 Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations); Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶¶ 78–82 (Sept. 19, 2006) (inter-
preting the right to information). 
 281. See, e.g., Hatton v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 189, 234–
41 (joint dissent) (describing majority holding as a “deviat[ion]” from prior case-
law, “a step backwards,” and “turning against the current”); see also Balmer-
Schafroth v. Switzerland, App. No. 50495/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 26, 1997) (joint 
dissent) (critiquing the majority for ignoring IEL as, “[w]here the protection of 
persons in the context of the environment and installations posing a threat to 
human safety is concerned, all States must adhere to those principles”). 
 282. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 41 (1999) (citing Interpretation of 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 
I.C.J. Rep. 73, 76 (Dec. 20)) (“[A] rule of international law, whether customary 
or conventional, does not operate in a vacuum; it operates in relation to facts 
and in the context of a wider framework of legal rules of which it forms only a 
part.”); cf. Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 351, ¶ 57 (“[T]he principles un-
derlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum.”). 
 283. Coard, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, ¶ 41. 
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ask, “at what point does the interpretation of a treaty by refer-
ence to other rules of international law become the application 
of those other rules of international law?”284 While the risk is 
real for distant or unconnected regimes,285 it is less of a concern 
in the case of congruent regimes where compliance with one re-
gime furthers the goals of the other.  
Second, human rights treaties are notable in this respect 
since courts, in interpreting human rights treaties, place empha-
sis on their special object and purpose: the protection of human 
beings. This is reflected in the pro homine principle, which has 
been particularly influential in the Inter-American context. As 
the Inter-American Commission has indicated, in considering 
and applying external sources of law—i.e., other regimes—the 
decisive factor is to “give effect to the normative standard which 
best safeguards the rights of the individual.”286  
In cases arising at the nexus of human rights and the envi-
ronment in the domestic context, for example, human rights tri-
bunals have already found that safeguarding the rights of the 
individual requires reading human rights conventions in the 
light of the State’s international environmental obligations. For 
example, in Saramaka People, the Inter-American Court re-
ferred to IEL to define procedural safeguards for natural re-
source projects on indigenous land.287 The Court has expanded 
on this approach in its Advisory Opinion. In it, it signaled that, 
in the context of transboundary environmental harm as in the 
purely domestic context, States’ duties under the Convention 
 
 284. Philippe Sands & Jeffery Commission, Treaty, Custom and Time: Inter-
pretation/Application?, in TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVEN-
TION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: 30 YEARS ON 41 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. 
eds., 2010). 
 285. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 225 (Nov. 
6) (separate opinion by Higgins, J.). 
 286. Coard, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, ¶ 42. 
 287. See, e.g., Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Mer-
its, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, 
¶¶ 130–131 (Nov. 28, 2007); see also Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. 
Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, 
¶ 214 (June 27, 2012) (citing Rio Declaration, supra note 84); see also Indige-
nous Rights, supra note 100, ¶¶ 159, 192 (referring to numerous international 
treaties and instruments, including Amazon Cooperation Treaty, World Char-
ter for Nature, Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna and Natural Sce-
nic Beauties of America, Rio Declaration, CBD, and Protocol of San Salvador); 
Ecuador Report, supra note 134 (referencing 1994 Declaration of Principles of 
the First Summit of the Americas and World Charter for Nature). 
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must be interpreted in the light of international environmental 
law.288 
Why would courts look beyond the confines of the human 
rights regime in these cases? Because the normative standard 
offered by IEL is often more specific and concrete than that con-
tained in human rights law and therefore more effective at safe-
guarding the rights of the individual. While this case law, as ex-
plained above, has invariably involved environmental harm to 
domestic parties, the reasoning applies with equal force in the 
extraterritorial context.  
For example, application of well-established international 
environmental principles, such as the precautionary principle,289 
would arguably “best safeguard[]” the rights of the potentially 
affected individuals by placing the onus on the State to take cer-
tain positive measures ex ante to identify risks—and to pre-
vent—potentially adverse environmental impacts that could 
harm human rights.290  
Third, beyond systemic and purposive interpretation, there 
is a further basis for courts to consider relevant principles from 
other regimes: congruous interpretation of human rights treaties 
with other legal regimes can be instrumental in ensuring their 
longevity and relevance. As noted above, courts treat human 
rights treaties as “living instruments, the interpretation of 
which must evolve over time and reflect current living condi-
tions.”291 As such, evolutive interpretation has been particularly 
 
 288. Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 19,  
¶¶ 115–116 (noting, inter alia, the duty to prevent environmental harm and the 
duty to cooperate with potentially affected States). 
 289. The status of the precautionary principle is contested. See supra note 
45. The United States, for example, does not consider it to be a principle let 
alone a rule of international law. See Panel Reports, European Communities—
Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (GMOs 
Case), ¶¶ 4.541–4.542, WTO Docs. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R 
(Sept. 29, 2006).  
 290. Precautionary measures also exist in human rights procedure; however, 
in cases involving environmental risks to human rights, it is the application of 
the precautionary principle that might trigger the issuance of precautionary 
measures. See also Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra 
note 19, ¶¶ 175–180. 
 291. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
245, ¶ 161; see also Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 146–
148 (Aug. 31, 2001) (“[H]uman rights treaties are live instruments whose inter-
pretation must adapt to the evolution of the times and, specifically, to current 
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prominent in human rights law. For instance, the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission has taken into account environmental laws that 
“are directly relevant for the interpretation of the Inter-Ameri-
can human rights instruments, by virtue of the evolutionary and 
systematic interpretive approach.”292 
To be sure, the evolutionary approach is not unique to hu-
man rights law. As the World Court noted in interpreting a 
treaty that predated certain recent environmental laws in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, “the Treaty is not static, and is open 
to adapt to emerging norms of international law.”293 Similarly, 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration applied evolutive interpre-
tation in the Iron Rhine arbitration to “ensure an application of 
the treaty that would be effective in terms of its object and pur-
pose.”294  
In sum, interpreting a State’s duties under human rights 
law congruently with its obligations under international envi-
ronmental law can further the goals of both regimes at their 
points of intersection. There is no risk of trampling on State sov-
ereignty or saddling States with duties they did not sign up for. 
First, the basic obligation to prevent transboundary harm is cus-
tomary law. Second, reading the State’s duties under human 
rights law together with its obligations under international en-
vironmental law would help protect persons who are the in-
tended beneficiaries under both regimes. Third, in permitting 
 
living conditions.”); Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Frame-
work of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶¶ 114–115 (Oct. 1, 1999) (identifying as part 
of the “corpus juris of . . . human rights law” the principle that “human rights 
treaties are living instruments whose [interpreters] must consider changes over 
time and present-day conditions”); Interpretation of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 37–38, 43 (July 14, 1989); cf. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. 
No. 15318/89, ¶ 71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 23, 1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng? 
i=001-57920 (“That the Convention is a living instrument which must be inter-
preted in the light of present-day conditions is firmly rooted in the Court’s case-
law.”). 
 292. Indigenous Rights, supra note 100, ¶ 193 (emphasis added); see also 
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, 
¶ 161 (applying “evolutionary interpretation”). 
 293. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 
¶ 112 (Sept. 25); see also VCLT, supra note 79, art. 31(1). 
 294. Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Ry. (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, 73, ¶ 80 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005). 
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pollution to cross its boundaries, the State is effectively project-
ing its power outward; it is only reasonable that legal conse-
quences should attach. Recognizing the regime nexus and hold-
ing States accountable for transboundary environmental harm 
under human rights treaties would therefore be consistent with 
both State sovereignty and basic fairness.  
B. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES  
If international environmental norms should inform the in-
terpretation of State duties under human rights law at the re-
gime nexus, as this Article argues, this raises several further 
questions. First, how far must a State go in respecting or ensur-
ing the rights of persons in other countries? Put differently, 
when should a State incur international responsibility for trans-
boundary environmental harm to human rights? Second, to what 
extent, and under what circumstances, could a State invoke the 
responsibility of another State on behalf of non-State victims? 
Finally, can an injured party bring a claim directly against the 
polluting State under international human rights law? The fol-
lowing discussion offers some preliminary thoughts on these is-
sues that we are likely to encounter in the near future. 
1. The Scope of State Obligations  
If a State has (a) a duty under general international law 
and, as the case may be, under MEAs, not to cause transbound-
ary environmental harm and (b) a duty under human rights law 
not to injure the rights of persons who are subject to its “juris-
diction,” how far must a State go in respecting or ensuring the 
rights of persons in other countries? As noted above, the direct 
effects test—the only test that could accommodate the regime 
nexus—risks being overly broad without limiting principles.295  
Limiting principles are critical in the context of transbound-
ary environmental harm, where risks and impacts can increas-
ingly be teleported far beyond their source. Misuse of new tech-
nologies (such as geoengineering), water depletion, herbicide 
spraying, or burning of forests in one State can all have far-
reaching impacts in other States. Climate change is the quintes-
sential global environmental problem, as continuing emissions 
anywhere can cause disastrous consequences everywhere else. 
In each of these examples, State activities (or failure to regulate 
 
 295. See supra Part III.E. 
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private activities) are the factual cause of the injury. However, 
it does not necessarily follow that legal responsibility should at-
tach, as the injury could be too remote, insignificant, or indi-
rect.296 So, where should we draw the line?  
The essential question, I would argue, is whether the State 
is in a position to prevent the specific harm in question. Preven-
tion is a fundamental duty under both international environ-
mental law297 and human rights law,298 and the Draft Articles 
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm are helpful in sketching 
out its content. The Draft Articles apply to activities that, while 
not in themselves prohibited by international law, nonetheless 
pose a risk of significant transboundary harm.299 This entitles 
the potentially affected State(s) to demand compliance with the 
duty to prevent even if the activity itself is not prohibited.300  
The obligation to take preventive measures is one of due dil-
igence.301 The general standard under international law is not 
strict liability: the harm must be foreseeable and the State must 
have known, or should have known (had it acted with due dili-
gence),302 that a given activity poses a risk of significant harm.303 
In other words, did the State exercise due care by taking 
measures—through its legislative, regulatory, or enforcement 
powers—to reduce the likelihood of harm?304 The required de-
gree of care in any given case will be proportional to the risk of 
harm: the higher the potential degree of harm, the greater the 
duty of care required.305  
 
 296. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1931 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1941) (noting that damage which is “too indirect, remote, and uncertain to be 
appraised” cannot support indemnity); cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
supra note 65, at 92–93, ¶ 10 (“[C]ausality in fact is a necessary but not a suffi-
cient condition for reparation.”). 
 297. See supra Part IV.A. 
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 131–36. 
 299. See Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 29, art. 1. 
 300. Id. at 150, ¶ 6. 
 301. Id. at 154, ¶¶ 7–8.  
 302. Id. at 153, ¶ 5. 
 303. The “significance” criterion is necessarily ambiguous. See id. at 152,  
¶ 4 (“The term ‘significant’ . . . involves more factual considerations than legal 
determination. It is . . . something more than ‘detectable’ but need not be at the 
level of ‘serious’ or ‘substantial.’ The harm must lead to a real detrimental effect 
on matters such as, for example, human health, industry, property, environ-
ment or agriculture in other States.”); see also id. at 152, ¶ 6. 
 304. Id. at 154, ¶¶ 6, 10. 
 305. Id. at 155, ¶ 18. 
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What due diligence requires in any given case will depend 
on the legal and factual context. Generally speaking, the exercise 
of due diligence in the transboundary setting has several basic 
elements. First, the State must conduct prior and ongoing as-
sessment of risk of any activities that are likely to have a signif-
icant adverse impact on the environment.306 This would require, 
inter alia, the use of transboundary EIAs based on the best avail-
able science. Second, the State must notify and engage in good 
faith consultation with the potentially affected State(s).307 Third, 
the State must protect procedural environmental rights of the 
potentially affected persons—to information, participation, and 
remedy, as discussed further below.308  
In addition, if there is no scientific certainty over the im-
pacts, the State would need to apply the precautionary principle 
in its activities so as to avoid or prevent serious or irreversible 
damage.309  
Turning from due diligence to the issue of harm, we need to 
be able to trace the chain of causation from activities in the State 
to the injury in the other State so as to find “the physical link 
between the cause (activity) and the effect (harm).”310 In other 
words, the harm caused must be sufficiently direct and concrete. 
The ILC also proposed a further criterion: the transboundary 
harm must have been caused by the physical consequences of 
such activities.311 This limiting principle is important because it 
goes to the concern identified above—that any ripple effects of 
domestic policies might attract international liability, which 
would be unreasonable. This limitation makes the issue more 
manageable by “exclud[ing] transboundary harm which may be 
caused by State policies in monetary, socio-economic or similar 
fields.”312 As understood in this Article, “physical consequences” 
resulting in significant harm encompass adverse changes, 
whether visible or invisible, to air, water, ecosystem integrity, 
flora, fauna, or human health.313 This standard also ensures that 
 
 306. See id. at 158, ¶¶ 3–4, n.900; supra Part IV.B. 
 307. Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 29, at 159, ¶¶ 2–4, 160, ¶ 2.  
 308. See infra Part V.B.3. 
 309. Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 29, at 155, ¶ 14, 162, ¶¶ 5–6. 
 310. Id. at 148, ¶ 2. 
 311. Id. at 151, ¶ 16. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 148, ¶¶ 1–2, 149, ¶ 1. 
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it will be more feasible to trace the chain of causation and estab-
lish liability.  
It should be noted that, in an actual dispute, applicable 
MEAs will likely further define the due diligence standard. For 
example, regional seas conventions or international river-basin 
agreements and their protocols often set out detailed risk assess-
ment, monitoring, verification, and risk management standards 
that the State must live up to.  
To summarize, in a nexus case, the State could incur inter-
national responsibility under a human rights treaty where it 
failed to prevent transboundary environmental harm originat-
ing in its territory that was foreseeable, direct, significant, and 
that was within its power to prevent had it exercised due care.314 
This is consistent with the polluter-pay principle.315 Each of 
these issues—foreseeability, causal link, concreteness, and sig-
nificance—require further development through jurisprudence, 
but the essential framework that human rights tribunals can ap-
ply is already in place.316 The same analysis would apply even if 
the harm originated in private activities, such as industrial pol-
lution in Trail Smelter,317 for which Canada ultimately bore re-
sponsibility. States are presumed to be aware of activities taking 
place in their territory318 and to have the power to regulate them.  
 
 314. Compare Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra 
note 19, ¶¶ 119–120 (reasoning that international responsibility would attach 
if the State (a) knew, or should have known, that there was a real and immedi-
ate risk to protected rights, and failed to take the necessary measures that 
would have been reasonably expected to prevent such risk, and (b) if there is a 
causal link between the significant harm to the environment and the human 
rights impacts). 
 315. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 84, princ. 16. 
 316. If a State has breached its primary obligations under human rights law, 
as informed by IEL, the next step is to determine the legal consequences of that 
violation. There, the secondary rules of State responsibility under general in-
ternational law would apply. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra 
note 65, at 84–85, ¶¶ 1–3. Normal rules of attribution would follow. See id. at 
34–35. Conduct attributable to the State can consist of actions or omissions, and 
it would cover actions of private actors. Id. 
 317. See supra text accompanying notes 240–42. 
 318. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 18–22 (Apr. 
9) (holding Albania liable for failure to notify others of dangers within its terri-
torial waters). 
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2. Advocacy on Behalf of Non-State Victims 
The argument presented in this Article, that States have ex-
traterritorial obligations under human rights law to prevent en-
vironmental harm, also raises the question of whether, and in 
what circumstances, a State could invoke the responsibility of 
another State on behalf of non-State victims.319 The ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility specifically contemplate that a 
State “other than the injured State acting in the collective inter-
est” could invoke the responsibility of another State.320 The ILC 
envisaged two situations where this might be the case. 
The first is the breach of collective obligations owed to a 
group of States and established in some “collective interest”321 
(obligations erga omnes partes), such as protection of the regional 
environment, a nuclear-free zone treaty, or a regional human 
rights system.322 Within the Inter-American system, all States 
have a legal interest in ensuring the regime’s integrity.323 For 
example, the United States could raise concerns about the plight 
of another State’s residents as a result of a third State’s pollu-
tion, or vice-versa.  
The second situation is the breach of an obligation owed “to 
the international community as a whole”324 (obligations erga om-
nes). The list of such obligations will evolve over time, but would 
include, at a minimum, respect for fundamental human rights 
 
 319. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the 
Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 801–02 (2002); Brunnée, supra 
note 69, at 353. 
 320. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 65, art. 48. 
 321. Id. art. 48(1)(a). 
 322. Id. 
 323. See American Convention, supra note 33, art. 45(1) (“Any State Party 
may . . . declare that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive 
and examine communications in which a State Party alleges that another State 
Party has committed a violation of a human right set forth in this Convention.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Brown Weiss, supra note 319, at 806. 
 324. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 65, art. 48(1)(b); see 
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 
3, ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 5) (“By their very nature, [the obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole] are the concern of all States. In view 
of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. [These] obligations 
derive . . . from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the hu-
man person.”). 
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and the right of self-determination.325 The ILC also proposed in-
cluding obligations aimed at protecting the marine environment 
in the collective interest.326 Climate change too represents a 
“common concern of humanity.”327 Indeed, many of the problems 
considered in this Article fall in that category. 
Neither provision has been tested in State practice. How-
ever, both would logically apply at the regime nexus of human 
rights and environmental law—two areas that, by definition, 
transcend narrow State interests. Scholars have recognized the 
importance of allowing States to hold their peers accountable for 
human rights violations, a move away from bilateralism in in-
ternational law.328 However, while available in theory, it is no 
more likely that a State would rely on these provisions on behalf 
of a third State’s residents, than it would use inter-State pro-
ceedings to protect its own nationals, which, as we have seen, is 
rare.329 For regions with a developed regional human rights sys-
tem, such as the Americas, the human rights regime still repre-
sents a more promising venue for transboundary victims to seek 
international redress.  
 
 325. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 65, at 127, ¶¶ 8–10; 
see also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 
Rep. 7, 117–19 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion by Vice President Weeramantry) 
(environmental obligations); Application of Convention on Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objec-
tions, 1996 I.C.J. 616 (July 11) (genocide); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 
I.C.J Rep. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30) (the right of self-determination). 
 326. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 65, at 127, ¶¶ 8–10. 
States’ criminal liability, omitted from the final version, would have included 
environmental harm. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on State Responsi-
bility, in Rep. on the Work of Its Twenty-Ninth Session, art. 19(3)(d), U.N. Doc. 
A/32/10 (1977) (proposing that “a serious breach of an international obligation 
of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human en-
vironment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of 
the seas” be deemed an international crime). 
 327. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., May 2, 1992, 
S. Treaty Doc. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; G.A. Res. 43/55, Protection of Global 
Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, ¶ 1 (Dec. 6, 1988); see 
also Jutta Brunnée, International Legal Accountability Through the Lens of the 
Law of State Responsibility, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 25 (2005) (discussing 
“common area,” “common heritage,” and “common concern” concepts). 
 328. See, e.g., Brunnée, supra note 327, at 13–14. 
 329. See supra text accompanying notes 82–83. 
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3. Individual Claims  
This being the case, a related question then is whether, and 
to what extent, an individual claimant would be able to bring a 
claim directly against the polluting State under the American 
Convention (or a similar treaty). It would be pointless to recog-
nize the States’ human rights obligations for transboundary en-
vironmental degradation but deny victims access to remedies.330 
There are several hurdles to consider. 
First, in international human rights law, a claimant’s ability 
to bring suit against the State is conditioned on prior exhaustion 
of domestic remedies (or evidence that doing so would have been 
impossible or futile).331 The local remedies rule, an admissibility 
requirement, is intended to give the respondent State the oppor-
tunity to review and rectify the harm within its own domestic 
system before the issue is elevated to the international level.332  
This poses particular difficulties for transboundary claim-
ants—where the State responsible for the injury is a State other 
than their own and where exhaustion of “domestic” remedies re-
ally means foreign remedies.333 Consequently, it has been sug-
gested that where an individual is injured by the act of a foreign 
State with which he or she has no connection (and did not volun-
tarily assume the risk)—such as environmental pollution or ra-
dioactive fallout—the local remedies rule should be relaxed.334  
 
 330. Cf. OHCHR Report, supra note 26, ¶ 72 (“Those who are adversely af-
fected by environmental degradation must be able to exercise their rights, irre-
spective of whether the cause of environmental harm originates in their own 
State or beyond its boundaries and whether [its] cause . . . lies in the activities 
of States or transnational corporations.”). 
 331. The rule is set out in Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention, supra 
note 33. Article 46(2) lists the exceptions (e.g., lack of due process, denial of 
access to remedies, or unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment). See 
also Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) 
and 46(2)(b)), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Aug. 10, 1990). 
The rule requiring the exhaustion of local remedies as a prerequisite for the 
exercise of diplomatic protection is “a well-established rule of customary inter-
national law.” Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, 1959 I.C.J. 
6, 27 (Mar. 21); cf. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 
15, 31, ¶ 50 (July 20). 
 332. Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 27. 
 333. See supra text accompanying notes 11–13.  
 334. For a discussion, see Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra 
note 8, at 81–82, ¶¶ 8–9; Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 65, 
art. 44(b). 
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However, the rule remains relevant in the transboundary 
context. Before petitioning an international tribunal, claims 
should still first be vetted in the courts of first instance in the 
respondent State, which have the power to order interim 
measures and enjoin the harm-causing activities. On the other 
hand, if the State in which the harm originates does not provide 
an adequate forum in which transboundary claimants can bring 
a suit, the exhaustion requirement should be deemed to have 
been met, and claimants should be able to proceed directly with 
their application at the international level.335  
Second, there is the question of procedural environmental 
rights and their implementation in the transboundary context. 
In case of potential harm, the State in which the harm originates 
must notify and consult the potentially affected States,336 as well 
as its own public.337 This is well-established. But what of the for-
eign public? Regime effectiveness and justice both suggest that 
the State should provide equal access to information, participa-
tion, and remedies to foreign persons who are at risk as to its 
own residents. The Inter-American case law has emphasized the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination in extending the 
reach of State obligations extraterritorially,338 while the ILC has 
 
 335. See also Aarhus Convention, supra note 90, arts. 3(9), 9; Draft Princi-
ples on Liability, supra note 250, princ. 6(1) (“States shall provide their domestic 
judicial and administrative bodies with the necessary jurisdiction and compe-
tence and ensure that these bodies have prompt, adequate and effective reme-
dies available in the event of transboundary damage caused by hazardous ac-
tivities located within their territory or otherwise under their jurisdiction or 
control.”). 
 336. See supra notes 262–67. 
 337. See supra notes 133–34. A new treaty for Latin America and the Carib-
bean lends further support to this principle. See Regional Agreement on Access 
to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú Convention), art. 1, Mar. 4, 2018, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2018/03/20180312%2003-04%20PM/CTC 
-XXVII-18.pdf (not yet in force) (open for signature from 27 September 2018 to 
26 September 2020). 
 338. See supra note 197. The principle has jus cogens status in the Americas. 
See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶¶ 83–101 (2003); see also 
Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 19, ¶¶ 231, 238–
240. 
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relied on the non-discrimination principle in its 2001 Draft Arti-
cles on Transboundary Harm,339 as have a number of treaties.340 
These developments support the transboundary application of 
procedural environmental rights.341  
The cross-border context makes implementation more chal-
lenging, but the duty could be met in part by working with the 
potentially affected State(s) and relying on them to disseminate 
the relevant information to their own public(s) and facilitate 
their participation.342 The responsible State, however, would ul-
timately need to give transboundary claimants access to its 
courts or administrative procedures where they are not able to 
protect their rights at home. Where such access is denied, it 
could constitute an additional basis of liability before the inter-
national human rights tribunal, which could in turn order the 
respondent State to modify its domestic legislation. 
Third, a further challenge is the particularity requirement. 
In the domestic context, human rights courts have maintained 
that injury to the environment per se, or to the public at large, 
would not establish standing, let alone a treaty violation.343 In-
stead, to give rise to international responsibility, evidence of di-
rect harm to a right protected by the treaty is needed, and the 
duty of protection must be owed to a specifically affected rights-
holder. This is a problem for transboundary environmental 
harm, which often affects a large segment of the population. 
Holding that injury to all is injury to none would amount to a 
denial of justice. The particularity requirement should therefore 
 
 339. Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 29, art. 15; see also Draft Prin-
ciples on Liability, supra note 250, princ. 6(2) (“Victims of transboundary dam-
age should have access to remedies in the State of origin that are no less prompt, 
adequate and effective than those available to victims that suffer damage, from 
the same incident, within the territory of that State.”). 
 340. See, e.g., Watercourses Convention, supra note 262, art. 32; cf. Rio Dec-
laration, supra note 84, princ. 10. 
 341. On transboundary civil liability, see Boyle, supra note 16, at 8–9 (argu-
ing that the principle of nondiscrimination provides for a right of access to rem-
edies for victims of transboundary pollution in the source State, regardless of 
nationality or residence); see also Knox, supra note 23, at 96–99. 
 342. Cf. Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 29, art. 13, cmt. at 166,  
¶ 7. 
 343. See, e.g., Metropolitan Nature Reserve v. Panama, Case 11.533, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 88/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. ¶ 34 
(2003); Kyrtatos v. Greece, 2003-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 52; Brun v. France, 
Commc’n No. 1453/2006, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/88/D/1453/2006, ¶ 6.3 (2006); cf. Boyle, supra note 87, at 485, 505–06; 
Knox, supra note 23, at 85 (“Human rights are inherently anthropogenic . . . .”). 
  
1956 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1879 
 
not be used to preclude claims involving a large class344 or claim-
ants acting in the public interest.  
Finally, the standards of proof for environmental harm in 
the domestic legal system and at the international level may dif-
fer. In the former, the standard will often be strict liability, 
which would advantage the claimant if the source of harm is 
clear. At the international level, both human rights law and in-
ternational environmental law, as discussed above, require evi-
dence that the State has failed to exercise due diligence, for ex-
ample, by failing to regulate, control, or enforce its laws. This 
means that the burden of proof for the claimant in international 
proceedings could be significantly higher (and the likelihood of 
success significantly lower) than in domestic proceedings.  
There are thus implementation hurdles, but they are not in-
surmountable. The human rights regime’s existing procedures 
are sufficient, even without modification, to allow individual 
claimants to bring claims against foreign States for transbound-
ary pollution. The first step will generally consist of bringing 
claims in the courts of the respondent State through the vehicle 
of transnational litigation. International human rights law will 
provide the backstop and a venue of last resort where transna-
tional litigation cannot produce an effective remedy. 
 CONCLUSION  
The dawn of the Anthropocene has left many international 
lawyers pessimistic about the power of international law to avert 
environmental collapse. As Oscar Schachter noted nearly thirty 
years ago, “[t]o say that a state has no right to injure the envi-
ronment of another seems quixotic in the face of the great variety 
of transborder environmental harms that occur every day.”345 
Perhaps we cannot always rely on States’ rights under interna-
tional environmental law, but, as this Article shows, this is not 
the end of the story. Environmental law does not exist in a vac-
uum: the human rights regime complements and reinforces 
 
 344. Recent decisions on climate change—where everyone is affected yet the 
petitions were allowed to proceed—chart a possible way forward. See, e.g., Juli-
ana v. United States, 217 F.3d 1224, 1243–44 (D. Or. 2016) (explaining the gen-
eralized grievance rule); cf. Covington v. Jefferson Cnty., 358 F.3d 626, 651 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring) (“[T]he most recent Supreme Court precedent 
appears to have rejected the notion that injury to all is injury to none for stand-
ing purposes.”). 
 345. Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 
44 J. INT’L AFF. 457, 462–63 (1991). 
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these norms by giving victims of transboundary harm a direct 
remedy against the polluting State.  
Recognizing regime congruence in theory and in practice is 
important for both redress for victims and unity of international 
law. Tribunals have already acknowledged this in one line of 
cases, where the harm originates and ends in the same State. 
The next line of cases will call on judges to give meaning to the 
regime nexus in cases involving extraterritorial harm. The con-
ceptual challenge is smaller than it may appear. The law, as this 
Article has shown, is more than capable of evolution in its un-
derstanding of extraterritoriality and would support the appli-
cation of human rights treaties to transboundary environmental 
harm (via the direct effects test). Just as States can no longer 
escape international responsibility when their agents open fire 
at persons across the boundary line, they should expect to be 
held accountable when activities occurring under their control 
cause harmful cross-border consequences. 
Congruent regimes, as defined here, are mutually support-
ive. On the one hand, giving effect to international environmen-
tal law in the nexus cases, as this Article has argued, supports 
the protection of human beings, which is the object of human 
rights treaties. The duties of harm prevention, due diligence, and 
cooperation are all designed to avert environmental harm and, 
by extension, its negative effects on people.  
On the other hand, the human rights regime can give teeth 
to the international environmental law regime. First, human 
rights law allows for individual petitions, which, as noted above, 
are more likely to bring meritorious claims to light than are in-
ter-State disputes, which are rare. This could significantly ex-
pand the scope of the enforcement of international environmen-
tal law. Consideration of these types of claims by human rights 
tribunals would mean that victims would not be denied justice 
where their governments are not willing or able to protect them 
from neighborhood pollution. Many environmental regimes, 
moreover, do not provide for either inter-State or individual en-
forcement of State undertakings. The human rights regime, for 
example, could provide an important avenue of redress for vic-
tims of climate change, if there is direct evidence of climate-in-
duced harms that can be traced back to another State.346 Second, 
 
 346. In the case of climate change, individuals have resorted to litigation in 
national courts to support the Paris Agreement, with varying success. See gen-
erally Maria L. Banda & Scott Fulton, Litigating Climate Change in National 
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the principles of interpretation applied by international human 
rights courts—purposive (pro homine), evolutive, and systemic—
are aimed at protection. In interpreting a “living treaty,” human 
rights courts look for its object and purpose, and not to the inter-
pretation that would provide the most limited understanding of 
State obligations.347  
It could be countered that human rights judgements are not 
always complied with, and that it would be quixotic to expect a 
better outcome in the nexus cases. This might be true in a single 
case, but international law is a dynamic, iterative process. Con-
gruent interpretation of environmental norms by human rights 
courts could indirectly reinforce compliance with the environ-
mental regime in the long run by increasing the cost of violation 
for States, spreading ideas horizontally and vertically across 
courts,348 and driving normative change.349 As noted at the out-
set, over time, the argument developed in this Article could sig-
nificantly expand access to justice for victims and increase ac-
countability in the Western Hemisphere and beyond. 
Congruous interpretation can thus mutually support the ob-
ject of both regimes, but up to a point. A major limitation is that 
human rights law does not protect the environment as such.350 
In cases where transboundary environmental harm has “merely” 
caused harm to the environment (without causing quantifiable 
injury to human beings), or the global commons, the human 
rights regime has historically been of little use. The one excep-
tion has been the enforcement of procedural environmental 
rights (to information, participation, and access to justice). But 
 
Courts: Recent Trends and Developments in Global Climate Law, 47 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10121 (2017). See also Daniel Bodansky, The Role of the International 
Court of Justice in Addressing Climate Change: Some Preliminary Reflections, 
49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 689, 692 (2017) (advocating for ICJ adjudication). 
 347. See ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 27, ¶ 130 (discussing evolu-
tive interpretation). 
 348. See Ferrer Mac-Gregor, supra note 36, at 93–94. 
 349. Cf. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Incomplete Internalization and Com-
pliance with Human Rights Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 725 (2008) (arguing that 
even shallow commitments can trigger social processes that generate deeper 
reform); Philippe Sands, Climate Change and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the 
Future in International Law, 28 J. ENVTL. L. 19, 26 (2016) (“[I]nternational 
courts and tribunals are one among many actors that occupy the large space in 
which global public consciousness is formed.”). 
 350. See supra note 343. Contra Draft Principles on Liability, supra note 
250, princ. 2(a)(iii) (defining “damage” as “significant damage caused to persons, 
property or the environment”) (emphasis added); see also id. cmt. ¶¶ 14–17. 
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where procedural rights have been observed, and environmental 
damage still occurs, the human rights regime has generally of-
fered no remedy. More recently, there have been signs that this 
may be changing and that courts are beginning to conceive of the 
regime nexus, and their own adjudicative role, more broadly.351 
This suggests that, beyond seeking to enable congruous interpre-
tation of these two regimes, as this Article has attempted to do, 
it will also be necessary to strengthen other procedures for the 
protection of the environment per se.  
 
 
 351. See Banda, supra note 19 (discussing the Inter-American Court’s recog-
nition of an “autonomous” right to a healthy environment under the American 
Convention, whereby nature is entitled to juridical protection even absent evi-
dence of harm to individuals). 
